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THE PATHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
Vincent Blasi*

I. THESIS
Constitutions are designed to control, or at least influence, future
events-political events, adjudicative events, to some extent even interactions between private parties. Yet the future is unknowable, largely
unpredictable, and inevitably variable. At any moment there exists a
short-run future, a long-run future, and a future in between. The future is virtually certain to contain some progress, some regression,
some stability, some volatility. How is a constitution supposed to operate upon this vast panoply?
That is a question that ought to loom large in the deliberations of
persons who propose and ratify new constitutions and new constitutional amendments. It is also a question that should form part of the
backdrop against which particular constitutional provisions are interpreted. Here I plan to address just one small part of that inquiry: what
perspective on the future should guide courts in interpreting the
speech, press, and assembly clauses of the first amendment to the
United States Constitution?
My thesis is that in adjudicating first amendment disputes and fashioning first amendment doctrines, courts ought to adopt what might be
termed the pathological perspective. That is, the overriding objective
at all times should be to equip the first amendment to do maximum
service in those historical periods when intolerance of unorthodox
ideas is most prevalent and when governments are most able and most
* Corliss Lamont Professor of Civil Liberties, Columbia University. B.A. 1964,
Northwestern University; J.D. 1967 University of Chicago. This article is a revised and
expanded version of the Samuel Rubin lecture, delivered Feb. 16, 1983, at the Columbia
Law School. I am indebted to friends and colleagues too numerous to list for their
valuable comments on preliminary drafts. Two friends, however, deserve special mention: Dean Benno C. Schmidt of the Columbia Law School, who first suggested that the
thesis of the article, which I had invoked in passing in previous work, required systematic justification; and Dean Terrance Sandalow of the University of Michigan Law
School, whose unusually thoughtful writing on constitutional theory has had a shaping if
not always welcome influence on my thinking. The article was presented at workshops
held at the law schools of Boston University, the University of Chicago, New York University, and Yale. I am grateful to members of those faculties who offered me their
criticisms and suggestions. I would also like to thank my research assistants Judith Cox,
James Kimmell, Jr., Monica Kuth, and Alexandra Rebay for their many contributions to

my understanding of various pathological periods.
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likely to stifle dissent systematically. The first amendment, in other
words, should be targeted for the worst of times.
I would not make that claim about all provisions of the federal
Constitution. Certain clauses-the equal protection and cruel and unusual punishment clauses, for example-may be designed, or at least
most wisely interpreted, to serve the society primarily in periods of unusual idealism or cohesion. Provisions of that sort may be more significant for their capacity to stimulate, channel, or institutionalize
progressive social change than for any role they may play in preserving
traditional arrangements. But the speech, press, and assembly clauses
of the first amendment, as well as some other provisions of the Constitution-the religion clauses and the dormant commerce clause come to
mind-are best viewed as having primarily a preservative function.' It
is accordingly the pathological perspective that ought to inform the way
those clauses are interpreted.
The central empirical proposition of my thesis is that certain segments of time are of special significance for the preservation of the basic liberties of expression and inquiry because the most serious threats
to those liberties tend to be concentrated in abnormal periods. To define such periods with any degree of precision is a challenge that must
await an examination of the reasons why courts ought to adopt the
pathological perspective. At the outset, however, it is necessary to address a few definitional considerations that bear on any assessment of
those reasons.
First, the pathologies about which courts ought to be concerned
are time-bound and exceptional. "Pathology" in the sense I use the
term is a social phenomenon, characterized by a notable shift in attitudes regarding the tolerance of unorthodox ideas. What makes a period pathological is the existence of certain dynamics that radically
increase the likelihood that people who hold unorthodox views will be
punished for what they say or believe. Those dynamics may operate
primarily in the legislative or executive branches of government and
may influence only decisions relating to criminal prosecution or the distribution of government benefits. Or the repressive dynamics may penetrate the judicial psyche and cause judges to interpret the first
amendment restrictively. In certain pathological periods, the most im1. The crucial distinction is between provisions of the Constitution that establish
the basic structure of the government and the most significant relationships of the political regime, and provisions that embody more discrete, and thus less "essential" though
often no less important, normative commitments or aspirations. Because the basic
structures and relationships are constitutive of the political community as an entity,
preservation and continuity should be viewed as the first priority when those provisions
are the subject of interpretation. In addition to the protection of free expression, the
constitutive provisions of the American Constitution include the systems of federalism
and separation of powers, the guaranty of a republican form of government, the separation of church and state, the legitimation of private property, the abolition of slavery and
race-determined citizenship, and the requirement of due process of law.
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portant dynamics may relate to the way prospective dissenters perceive
the risks that are entailed in identifying themselves as believers in unorthodox ideas or as opponents of particular government actions. One
feature unites the various pathologies that first amendment doctrine
should be designed to combat: a shift in fundamental attitudes or perceptions among one or another group of persons whose judgments
have an important influence on the general level and vigor of public
debate and private inquiry.
Second, pathology need not be a nationwide phenomenon. Shifts
in attitudes regarding the toleration of dissent that are confined to particular regions or localities should be of major concern in the formulation of first amendment doctrine. Boss Hague's antilabor reign of
terror in Jersey City during the 1930s and the counterattacks against
civil rights advocates mounted by numerous Southern communities in
the 1960s figure in my analysis just
as do the national Red Scare of
2
1919-1920 and the McCarthy Era.
Third, I do not propose that the applicability of specific doctrines
turn on a finding in a particular case that the situation in question is or
is not pathological. That form of contingent doctrine is in fact antithetical to my thesis. I propose rather that continually applicable doctrines
be formulated with emphasis on how well they would serve in the worst
of times. In deciding first amendment cases, therefore, courts would
always have to know roughly what evils they were guarding against as a
general matter, but never precisely whether a particular situation
amounted to such an evil.
Fourth, it is important not to confuse the notion of pathology that I
invoke with other types of pessimistic assumptions or worst-case projections that sometimes inform legal reasoning. For example, the familiar parade of horribles can be viewed as a worst-case scenario of
logical extrapolation: the acceptance of a particular principle as the
justification for a given result may support results in future cases that
are intuitively unappealing or even revolting. That type of projection
can operate at any time in any social context, and thus is different from
the notion of pathology that I invoke. The parade of horribles need not
2. The examples in the text are of twentieth century vintage, but pathologies have
occurred intermittently throughout American history. Prominent instances include: the
banishment of Ann Hutchinson from the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1637, see E. Morgan, The Puritan Dilemma (1958); the Salem witchcraft trials, seeJ. Demos, Entertaining
Satan (1982); the Alien and Sedition Acts, seeJ. Smith, Freedom's Fetters (1966); the
antiMasonic hysteria that gripped the nation during the 1820s and early 1830s, see A.
Tyler, Freedom's Ferment 351-58 (1944); the persecution of the Mormons during the
1840s and 1850s, see L. Arrington & D. Bitton, The Mormon Experience 44-64 (1979);
and the repression of anarchists after the Haymarket Riot of 1886, seeJ. Garraty, The
New Commonwealth 166-70 (1968). For a valuable anthology of alarmist writings
growing out of these and other pathologies, see The Fear of Conspiracy: Images of UnAmerican Subversion from the Revolution to the Present 73-84 (D. Davis ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as D. Davis].

452

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:449

depend on a major shift in basic attitudes. Similarly, a pessimistic view
about the dynamics of speech regulation in all eras could lead judges to
adopt the analytical device of assuming the worst in attempting to reconstruct or predict particular events pertinent to litigation. That device could justify courts in taking at all times a highly skeptical attitude
regarding claims by government officials that no censorial purpose lay
behind a given regulation, or a generous attitude toward claims by litigants that a law is likely to have a chilling effect on unidentified potential speakers. One could employ such predispositions not as a means of
guarding against the worst of times but rather in the belief that adjudicative fairness at all times would be enhanced thereby. Such an assumption is not time-bound or dependent on shifts of social attitudes.
In those respects it is different from the notion of pathology that informs my thesis.
To say that our working conception of pathology relates only to
temporary shifts in basic attitudes among certain influential actors is
only to begin the definitional aspect of the endeavor. Within the
bounds so established, one might still wonder whether "pathology" refers only to the very worst of times or also to comparatively bad but not
truly rare periods. One might ask what weight proportionately should
be given to such factors as the breadth of shift in attitudes, the intensity
with which the new repressive attitudes are held, the apparent durability of the consequences that flow from the shift, and a host of other
considerations. Moreover, exactly what kinds of "attitudes" are we to
examine? Those regarding the value of dissent in general? Regarding
the validity of certain premises that underlie the philosophical rationale
for free expression? Regarding how certain standard instances of dissenting speech should be treated? Regarding how innovative claims of
liberty of expression should be viewed? Those questions are formidable, but they cannot be addressed until it is established why as a matter
of first amendment theory courts ought to be concerned at all with the
concept of pathology.
II.

THE ARGUMENT

The salient feature of my thesis is the overriding importance it attaches to the goal of preserving the theoretical integrity and practical
effectiveness of a limited number of propositions that can be said to
constitute the "core" of the speech, press, and assembly clauses of the
first amendment. That goal is not lexically ordered in the sense that
the slightest gain in nurturing the core necessarily outweighs substantial costs regarding the quality of first amendment adjudication outside
the core. Nevertheless, short of extreme trade-offs, the strengthening
of the core takes priority. I place such emphasis on that endeavor because of a view I hold regarding the nature of constitutional limitations
generally.
The first task of any system of constitutional limitations is to guar-
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antee that the truly fundamental features of the framework of government are maintained. The function of a "constitution" is to
"constitute"-to "set up," "formally establish," "give form to," or
"cause to become fixed" certain structures and principles of governance.3 Consistent with this basic understanding of function there is, of
course, room for vigorous debate over the precise objectives of constitutionalism. However, the rich variation in theories of constitutionalism should not cause us to lose sight of the fact that the enterprise of
constitutional government is essentially preservative in nature.
One can view a constitution as primarily a bulwark against tyranny,
a force for tempering the shortsightedness and unruliness of electoral
politics, a statement of ideals, a check against majority oppression of
minorities, a means of pacing and ordering institutional change, a political totem, a mechanism for structuring interest group politics, or a last
resort for resolving political deadlocks. Each of these characterizations,
as well as others that could be posited, derives from a view regarding
the various objectives that are served by constraining representative institutions by means of the device of constitutional limitations. I do not
want to rest my case for the pathological perspective on a particular
ordering of the objectives of constitutionalism. My own thoughts on
the matter are not settled and, surprisingly, the vast literature on constitutional theory is sparse on this question of basic objectives. 4 The
argument for the pathological perspective is a convergence argument:
all plausible objectives of constitutionalism depend for their realization
on the existence of a considerable measure of continuity and stability
regarding the most basic structural arrangements and value commitments of the constitutional regime.
The reason for this convergence lies in the fact that all objectives
of constitutionalism by definition share a common feature: the goal of
limiting present exercises of political power by resort to some notion of
superior authority. The willingness of those who exercise political
power to recognize superior constitutional authority may derive from
perceptions of past commitment, calculations of reciprocal advantage,
or loyalties born of a sense of common endeavor. The wellsprings of
political authority are culturally dependent and often mysterious. But
unless the appeal to constitutionalism evokes genuine sentiments of
long-term commitment or aspiration, officials and citizens cannot be
expected to forego their preferences of the moment in deference to the
claims of the constitutional regime. There would seem to be an impor3. These definitions of "to constitute" are taken from Webster's Third New Inter-

national Dictionary 486 (unabridged ed. 1978).
4. All constitutional theorists assume certain objectives of constitutionalism but the
only modem writers I have found who consider explicitly the various objectives that
constitutional limitations can be thought to serve are Paul Brest and Carl Friedrich. See
Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. Rev. 204, 226
(1980); Friedrich, Constitutions and Constitutionalism, 3 Ency. Soc. Sci. 318 (1966).
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tant link, moreover, between the stability and continuity of the central
tenets of a system of constitutional limitations and its capacity to evoke
the requisite sentiments of commitment and aspiration in the persons
whom it seeks to constrain.
Only relatively stable principles are likely to be perceived by divergent political factions as potentially working to their advantage in the
long run. Only relatively stable principles are likely to be viewed as
worthy of a certain respect simply on account of their capacity to endure. Only if the expositors of constitutional principles avoid being
dominated by the political alignments and passions of the present can
those whose preferences are backed by force of arms or popular approval be expected to take a long-term view about the nature of political obligation. Whether constitutional provisions are invoked to
protect political minorities, break political deadlocks, raise the level of
public debate to a more idealistic plane, or serve any of the other possible objectives of constitutionalism, the relative continuity and stability
of the constitutional tradition is likely to have a major impact on the
success of the endeavor.
This is not to argue that innovation should be frowned upon in
developing a constitutional tradition, or that the quest for stability
should dominate the process of doctrinal formulation at every level.
Stability and continuity are important primarily with regard to the central structural arrangements and basic norms of the constitutional regime. It is those provisions that purport to define the political
community and embody the long-term commitments and aspirations of
the populace. The manner by which secondary arrangements and
norms should be extrapolated from the most basic provisions of the
Constitution is, of course, an intriguing and important subject of constitutional theory.5 But the prominence and vigor of disputation at that
level should not lead us to ignore the importance of continuity and stability regarding the central norms of the constitutional tradition.
A high regard for continuity and stability should not be confused
with a static view of the nature of constitutional limitations. No workable system of constitutional limitations can derive even its most basic
norms exclusively from the objectively perceived intentions of the original drafters and ratifiers of the constitutional text. The meaning that is
ascribed to a constitutional provision cannot help but be a function in
part of the intentions of the contemporary interpretors (and their audiences) as well as of the original formulators; to give meaning to any text
or event we cannot help but draw upon our own values, perceptions,
5. Most of the raging debates in constitutional theory concern this question of extrapolation. SeeJ. Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980); L. Lusky, By What Right? (1975);
M. Perry, The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights (1982); Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353 (1981); Sager, Rights Skepticism and ProcessBased Responses, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 417 (1981).
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and focal mechanisms. 6 Simply as a practical matter, the past cannot
control the present in the manner required by a static view of constitutionalism. There is a crucial difference, however, between respect for
the past in the form of adherence to the supposed intentions of the
original framers and respect for the past in the form of an appreciation
of the value of continuity, stability, and tradition in the process of constitutional interpretation. The undeniable importance of adaptation
and, under some views of the objectives of constitutionalism, creative
innovation at the margins of application should not lead us to ignore
the significant role played in a constitutional regime by a core of relatively stable and consistently enforced central norms.
The conclusion that the constitutional tradition should build upon
a limited number of relatively stable central norms does not help one to
identify which norms occupy the central place and thus qualify for the
special attention demanded by my thesis. That determination will be a
function of several factors, including the relationship of the norm to
other important features of the constitutional regime, the capacity of
the norm to remain both stable and efficacious over time, the extent to
which the norm embodies aspirations or fears that help to explain the
political community's commitment to constitutionalism in the first
place, and the extent to which the norm has played an important part in
the actual history of the polity. Whatever the measure adopted, however, it seems scarcely controversial to assert that at least some of the
norms of the first amendment occupy such a central place in the American constitutional tradition.
The elaborate system of rights and structures set out in the text of
the American Constitution makes sense only in the context of a commitment to limited government. That commitment necessarily entails
some degree of conceptual separation between the state and its citizens
and some practical capacity of citizens to challenge and check those
who wield power in the name of the state. Certain norms regarding
free expression and inquiry are integral to that conceptual separation
and practical capacity. 7 In this respect, the core commitments of the
first amendment serve as one of the linchpins of the entire constitutional regime. Few other provisions have so central a role to play in
6. See Brest, supra note 4; Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 469
(1981); Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 1033 (1981); Tushnet,
Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96
Harv. L. Rev. 781 (1983).
7. I have developed the notion of conceptual separation in Blasi, Toward a Theory
of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 Minn. L. Rev. 11, 69-85 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Blasi, Prior Restraint], and the notion of a checking capacity in Blasi, The
Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 Am. B. Found. ResearchJ. 521 [hereinafter cited as Blasi, Checking Value]. For a specification of the norms regarding free
expression that I view as integral to the scheme of limited government, see infra text
accompanying notes 15-25.
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constituting the American polity.8
Judged also by the measure of historical impact, the basic commitment to free expression and inquiry must be considered one of the central features of the American constitutional regime. One need not blot
from vision the intermittent periods of widespread, systematic repression of dissenters to appreciate the importance of free speech in the
development of the American republic. Mass movements of enduring
significance have emerged and presidents have been driven from office
because of expressive activities that are disallowed in many other systems of government. The most serious lapses in toleration of dissent,
such as the Alien and Sedition Acts, the Red Scare, and the McCarthy
Era, have acquired an aura of ignominy that says much about the importance of free speech in the pantheon of national ideals.
I conclude, therefore, that some propositions regarding freedom
of expression and inquiry number among the relatively stable central
norms of the American constitutional tradition. Because of their important role in the constitutional regime, it should be a matter of priority that those central norms be preserved and strengthened whenever
and wherever possible.
In most periods, the central norms of a constitutional tradition are
not challenged. The focus of controversy is elsewhere, on the frontiers
of doctrinal expansion, on novel claims whose pedigree can be established only by means of imaginative connections. We can expect this
centrifugal emphasis to be most common in mature constitutional systems, particularly those dominated by lawyers and maintained by adjudication. For lawyers, especially lawyers educated in the common law,
are interested primarily in the logic of the next step, in the case just
over the hill. Implications rather than premises are what lawyers are
trained to evaluate. Absent unusual social pressures, the central norms
of a provision like the first amendment-that news reporting cannot be
controlled by government, for example, or that citizens cannot be penalized for disagreeing with government policy-are taken for granted.
The core commitments that derive from those norms are not regarded
as burdensome or controversial. Normally, those core commitments
need no special tending; the ordinary dynamics of adjudication provide
more than sufficient protection.
The trouble is that this cheery description holds true only for most
periods of time, not all. In pathological periods, at least some of the
central norms of the constitutional regime are indeed scrutinized and
challenged. The core commitments that derive from those norms are
viewed by many as highly burdensome and controversial. In such periods the times seem so different, so out ofjoint, the threats from within
or without seem so unprecedented, that the Constitution itself is perceived by many persons as anachronistic, or at least rigidly, unrealisti8. See supra note 1.
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cally formalistic. In times when those misgivings take hold, the central
norms of the constitutional regime are injeopardy. The strength of the
political community's commitment to those norms is tested, and it may
matter a great deal how well the central norms were nurtured in the
periods of calm that preceded the pathology.
There is reason to believe that susceptibility to pathological challenge is especially characteristic of the central constitutional norms regarding free expression and inquiry. Most constitutional commitments
are fragile in the sense that they embody ideals that are easily abandoned or tempered in times of stress. Certain distinctive features of
the commitment to free speech enhance that fragility.
The aggressive impulse to be intolerant of others resides within all
of us. It is a powerful instinct. Only the most sustained socializationone might even say indoctrination in the value of free speech-keeps
the urge to suppress dissent under control. 9 When the constraints imposed by that socialization lose their effectiveness, as most social constraints intermittently do, the power of the instinct toward intolerance
usually generates a highly charged collective mentality. Because the instinct to suppress dissent is basic, primitive, and aggressive, it tends to
have great momentum when it breaks loose from the shackles of social
constraint. Aggression is contagious, and hatred of strangers for what
they believe is one of the safest and most convenient forms of aggression. The problem is compounded by the fact that the suppression of
dissent ordinarily is undertaken in the guise of political affirmation, of
insisting that everyone stand up and be counted in favor of the supposed true values of the political community. As such, this particular
type of challenge to constitutional liberties can take on the character of
a mass movement; it can engage the imagination of the man on the
street.
It would be a great mistake, moreover, to assume that pathologies
regarding the liberties of expression and inquiry constitute mere passing tempests, rough and unsettling at the time but of only limited significance in the long run. Some historians believe that the Red Scare
was a factor in the precipitous collapse during the 1920s of the once
potent Socialist movement in the United States.' 0 The State Department's corps of experienced specialists on the Far East was decimated
as a result of firings and forced resignations during the McCarthy Era;
9. For an insightful rumination on the control of intolerance, see Bollinger, The
Skokie Legacy: Reflections on an "Easy Case" and Free Speech Theory, 80 Mich. L.
Rev. 617 (1982).
10. See D. Shannon, The Socialist Party of America 99-125 (1955); Kolko, Decline
of American Radicalism in the Twentieth Century in For a New America 197-200,
206-07 (J. Weinstein & D. Eakins eds. 1970); see also R. Murray, Red Scare 263-78
(1964) (general catalogue of lingering effects of Red Scare). But see J. Weinstein, The
Decline of Socialism in America (1967); A. Kraditor, The Radical Persuasion 1890-1917,
at 13-33 (1981).
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miscalculations in American policy toward Vietnam have been attributed to that loss of expertise." The Hollywood Blacklist struggle of
1947-1953 left a residue of broken careers, expatriate talents, and extreme reluctance on the part of film studios to address controversial
subjects or portray social conditions of potential political significance. 12
The character of the trade union movement was permanently altered by
the expulsion during the anti-Communist purges of the 1950s of some
of its most skillful, uncompromising, and incorruptible leaders.13 Pathological periods tend to be short-lived, but their consequences linger
on.
So far I have argued that the central norms of the constitutional
tradition, which are normally immune from serious challenge both in
political debate and adjudication, tend to be placed in jeopardy during
pathological periods. That claim still does not establish that adjudication in ordinary times should be heavily influenced by the goal of
strengthening the central norms of the first amendment tradition
against the possibility of pathological challenges. Even if the most serious challenges to those norms tend to be concentrated in pathological
periods, it may be that the best way to fortify a constitutional regime
against pathological challenge is to develop a strong tradition of adjudication geared to normal times.
That possibility seems to me remote. Without some sort of consciously designed corrective, there is no reason to assume that adjudication in normal times will do a good job of nurturing the central
norms of the constitutional regime. When those norms are not themselves under challenge, their main function is to serve as starting points
for analogy or argumentation in disputes over the outer reaches of constitutional doctrine. That process may actually undercut the authority
of the central norms. Grand ideas can come to be regarded as cliches
when they are repeatedly invoked for partisan, rhetorical purposes in
settings far removed from those that gave birth to the ideas. The very
phenomenon of adversaries discerning radically different implications
from a common norm can weaken the community's understanding of
and devotion to the norm. The grist of everyday legal argumentation is
the manipulation of ideas. That tradition of manipulation, though perfectly appropriate in adversarial discourse, may make it more difficult
for the central norms of the constitutional regime to carry the authority
11. See D. Caute, The Great Fear 303-24 (1978); D. Halberstam, The Best and the
Brightest 323-25 (1972).
12. See L. Ceplair & S. Englund, The Inquisition in Hollywood: Politics in the Film
Community 1930-1960, at 422 (1983).
13. See D. Caute, supra note 11, at 349-400; D. Oshinsky, SenatorJoseph McCarthy and the American Labor Movement 98-100 (1976). The persecution of Harry
Bridges, colorful and effective leader of longshoremen, is recounted in detail in S.
Kutler, The American Inquisition 118-51 (1982).
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they must-to evoke the reverence and deep conviction they must-if
those norms are to withstand pathological pressures.
It remains to be demonstrated that a conscious effort by courts to
strengthen the central norms of the first amendment against the advent
of pathology would have the intended effect. I shall examine in some
detail several of the methodologies and doctrines that are indicated by
my thesis and explain how I think they would operate in pathological
periods. It must be emphasized, however, that the pathological perspective represents only a modification of emphasis, not a fundamental
reordering of legal thought. The potential effect of the shift in emphasis I advocate is limited, though hardly unimportant on that account.
Were courts to adopt my thesis, pathologies of repression would still
occur, sometimes in virulent form. It is unlikely that first amendment
doctrine, no matter how carefully constructed, could ever actually prevent a pathology. The most we can hope for is that well-prepared
methodologies and doctrines might help to blunt or delay the impact of
some pathological pressures, keep a pathology in certain bounds, or
stimulate the regenerative forces that permit a political community to
work its way out of a pathological period. Contributions of that sort
should not be undervalued.
Thus, if it is true that the preservation and effectuation of a limited
number of relatively stable central norms should be the first priority of
a constitutional regime, the process of constitutional adjudication
ought to be consciously designed to reflect that priority. The effort to
structure adjudication toward the end of strengthening the central
norms of the first amendment tradition must begin with the recognition
that the most serious threats to those norms, and to the commitments
they generate, tend to come in concentrated, unusual periods that are
properly described as pathological. The impact of doctrine in those
periods should accordingly be treated as a dominant consideration.
III.

DEFINING PATHOLOGY

The foregoing discussion was designed to show in a general way
that the concept of pathology ought to figure in first amendment analysis. Now it is time to develop the thesis with greater specificity. I wish
to explore a few of the implications that would follow from adoption of
the pathological perspective. To bring the inquiry to that plane, it is
necessary to develop a more detailed understanding of what makes a
particular period pathological.
The defining feature of a pathological period is the phenomenon
of an unusually serious challenge to one or more of the central norms
of the constitutional regime. My thesis addresses only one type of pathology: that involving a major challenge to the central norms of the
first amendment. In order to identify when such a challenge exists, it is
necessary to know what those central norms are. The pathological per-
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spective cannot supply that information. An independent understanding of first amendment values and priorities is required.
Given the major role played by history and tradition in my view of
constitutionalism in the United States, it should come as no surprise
that the value commitments I regard as most significant in determining
the core of the first amendment are those that are forged in the foundry
of political experience. Value commitments with that pedigree tend to
be simple, discrete, situation-oriented, and accessible. Because they
are not especially complicated, such value commitments are capable of
achieving a high degree of intuitive acceptance in the political culture.
And because even the most rigorous theorists are creatures of the political culture and tradition within which they work, the value commitments I have in mind tend to find support in a wide variety of efforts by
American scholars to justify free speech systematically. 14
Most of the value commitments that comprise the core of the first
amendment are relatively specific in nature: Government cannot employ coercive measures to shape the content of news coverage.1 5 Private citizens cannot be penalized for holding unpopular political
opinions or for criticizing particular government policies.' 6 The communication of a fact or value judgment relating to a matter of public
concern cannot be prohibited solely on the ground that the communication is false, injures reputation, erodes moral standards, or stirs people to anger; some form of culpability on the part of the speaker must
be established before any of these consequences can serve as a basis for
regulating speech. 17 Publicly owned areas cannot be placed off limits
to private speakers simply on the basis of the prerogatives of ownership; special justifications relating to competing public uses must be
invoked. 18 A private citizen cannot be required to affirm any loyalties
or beliefs unless he seeks to occupy a position of responsibility for
14. See, e.g., Z. Chafee, Free Speech in the United States 26-35, 42-51, 80-97,
128-40, 409-38 (1941); T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 26-41,
62-70, 124-29, 159-60, 202-04, 207-15, 277-79, 292-310, 397-99 (1970); F. Haiman,
Speech and Law in a Free Society 47-60, 87-99, 157-63, 267-83 (1981); M. Nimmer,
Nimmer on Freedom of Speech §§ 2.05, 2.07, 3.03, 4.04, 4.09[D] (1984); F. Schauer,
Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry 167-77, 189-99, 201-06 (1982).
15. See, e.g., Landmark Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
16. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Street v. New York, 394
U.S. 576 (1969); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
17. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347-48 (1974); Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964);
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983); Heffron v. International
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372
U.S. 229 (1963); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (plurality opinion).
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which certain loyalties or beliefs are relevant.' 9 Government cannot
inquire into the private thoughts or political affiliations of any citizen
except insofar as that information is important to an investigation of
patterns of antisocial conduct or fitness for positions of special responsibility.20 An individual cannot be held accountable for the beliefs, intentions, or actions of other persons or organizations simply on the
association or affiliation with those persons or
basis of his political
2
organizations. '
A few propositions of a more general nature have received sufficient acceptance over time to qualify for inclusion in the core of the first
amendment: A regulatory system that evaluates speech prior to its initial dissemination is especially problematic. 2 2 Courts should be highly
reluctant to base their decisions regarding constitutional protection on
ad hocjudgments regarding the truth or social worth of particular communications. 23 Arguments for regulation that depend on the claim that
audiences will be injured or induced to injure others by the message
conveyed by the speech must be treated with skepticism. 24 Harms that

allegedly flow from speech not immediately but by a process that takes
time to develop seldom provide a legitimate basis for suppressing the
must employ alternative means of
speech; whenever feasible the 2state
5
preventing harms of that sort.
were
Not all of the specific and general propositions just described
26
part of the original understanding of the first amendment.

Most of

19. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Cole v. Richardson, 405
U.S. 676 (1972); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
20. See, e.g., Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539
(1963); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Watkins v. United States, 354
U.S. 178 (1957).
21. See, e.g:,United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 228-30 (1961).
22. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Near v. Minnesota, ex rel. Olson 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Blasi, Prior Restraint, supra note 7; Emerson,
The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 Law & Contemp. Probs. 648 (1955).
23. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684
(1959).
24. See, e.g., Chicago Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99-101 (1972); Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Ely, Flag Desecration:
A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1482 (1975); Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment,
25 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 189 (1983).
25. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 372-78 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
26. In recent years, discussion of the original understanding of the first amendment
has been dominated by Leonard Levy's provocative, elaborately documented, and in my
opinion, seriously flawed thesis that the framers of the Bill of Rights had a narrow and
essentially nonlibertarian view of the freedoms of speech and the press. See L. Levy,
Legacy of Suppression (1960); see also L. Levy, The Emergence of a Free Press (1985)
(recently published, retitled, revised edition of Legacy of Suppression). For critiques of
Levy, see Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 455, 493-537
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them were at one time controversial; they achieved acceptance in the
political culture by first being boldly asserted by proponents, eventually
endorsed by key decisionmakers, and gradually recognized over time
by diverse elements of the political community. Not every serious student of the first amendment would subscribe to all of these propositions.2 7 But each of them is now sufficiently well entrenched in our first
amendment tradition as it has developed by means of adjudication and
public debate, and each commands broad enough support among persons who critically scrutinize that tradition, that this list of propositions
can properly be said to constitute the relatively stable, though always
evolving, core of the first amendment.
We could define pathology simply as a period during which the
rights implied by these core propositions are denied. The consequence
for the formulation of doctrine in normal periods would be that no doctrine should be in conflict with any of the core propositions. Our enterprise, however, is somewhat more complicated. We are attempting not
merely to identify the most serious incursions on the liberties of expression and inquiry but to develop patterns of thinking about the first
amendment that minimize the occurrence and the effects of such incursions. My claim is that the most serious threats to the core commitments of the first amendment tend to be concentrated in unusual,
intense periods and tend to derive from certain powerful social dynamics. It is not enough, therefore, for the definition of pathology to specify the incursions that violate the core commitments. It is important
also that the definition of pathology identify, at least in broad outline,
the social dynamics that generate concentrated, synergistic threats to
the basic liberties of expression. Only then can first amendment doctrines and methodologies be developed that are designed especially to
counter such threats.
As explained above, the central norms of the constitutional regime
in the United States derive their authority initially from public acceptance and depend for their continued effectiveness on the attitudes of
the political community. 28 The central norms are threatened when
public attitudes shift in significant ways. In the case of the core commitments of the first amendment, the attitudes that matter most are
those regarding the practical wisdom and moral propriety of tolerating
unorthodox, disrespectful, potentially disruptive ideas. We must seek
to understand, therefore, how a political community that ordinarily val(1983); Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of Expression, 84
Colum. L. Rev. 91 (1984).
27. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (Stevens, J.); Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (Stevens, J.); Bork, Neutral Principles
and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. LJ. I (1971); Jeffries, Rethinking Prior
Restraint, 92 Yale LJ. 409 (1983); Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment
Analysis, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 113 (1981).
28. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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ues tolerance and diversity of political opinion comes to insist at times
on conformity of expression and belief.
As Holmes so mischievously explained, toleration of unorthodox
ideas is hardly a natural impulse. 29 A special type of outlook on life is
necessary before one can justify the decision to allow proponents of
uncongenial points of view free rein to attempt to win converts.
Holmes emphasized fatalism.3 0 Brandeis stressed courage. 3 ' John Stuart Mill rested his argument for toleration on the empirical claim that
32
unorthodox thinkers contribute a great deal to social progress.
Others have identified respect for the autonomous individual as the
linchpin of tolerance.3 3 Whatever the differences that divide philosophers, at the level of popular belief the commitment to toleration of
dissent tends to depend upon two crucial variables: respect for individuality and distrust of government. Intolerance is likely to be most prevalent when the force of events causes increasing numbers of persons to
value conformity over individuality and to identify with the government, particularly in its historic role of attempting to maintain a certain
social order.
Despite significant crosscurrents, vicissitudes, and regional variations, the political traditions and historic social conditions of the
United States have by and large favored the development of a tolerant
attitude toward dissent. Many of the original settlers were refugees
from religious persecution. The nation was conceived at a time when
new ideas, scientific and political, influenced the thinking of ordinary
persons; seldom have reason and experimentation seemed so closely
related to social progress as in the late eighteenth century. The colonial experience left a legacy of distrust of government and a constitutional structure designed to forestall the concentration of power. The
vast frontier and the patterns of social mobility that are possible in a
migratory culture helped to generate an ethic of individualism. The
immigration waves created a polyglot community that made pluralism
the only feasible organizing principle for political life. The blessings of
abundant economic resources, peaceful neighbors, oceanic protection
from foreign attack, and success in military exploits made Americans a
may be the critical variable
self-confident people-and self-confidence
34
in the calculus of toleration.
Occasionally, however, even tolerance-engendering forces and tra29. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes,J., dissenting).

30. Id. at 630-31.
31. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).

32. SeeJ. Mill, On Liberty 55-59, 85-90 (Bobbs-Merrill ed. 1956).
33. See Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L.
Rev. 964 (1978); Leader, Free Speech and the Advocacy of Illegal Action in Law and
Political Theory, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 412 (1982); Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Ex-

pression, 1 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 204 (1972).
34. See C. Bay, The Structure of Freedom 303-07 (1965); D. Davis, supra note 2, at
xiii-xiv, 1-22; H. McClosky & A. Brill, Dimensions of Tolerance: What Americans Be-
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ditions such as these can be overshadowed by other developments that
undermine respect for individualism and distrust of government. One
situation that can stimulate a highly conformist, collectivist, potentially
intolerant mentality is when the government embarks upon an important undertaking that is thought to require an unusual amount of social
cooperation. The waging of war is the best example. The stakes are
high, the commitment of the political community to a specific objective
is great, and even the speculative possibility that internal dissent might
prevent the nation from maximizing its chances of success is troubling.
If the issue is defined as a choice between national self-defense and the
full realization of basic constitutional ideals, few persons would choose
the latter. The staunchest civil libertarian must concede the point that
the very existence of constitutional liberties depends on the maintenance of political independence. And as Zechariah Chaffee has demonstrated so well,3 5 when the collectivist thinking that is necessary for a
war effort takes hold, officials, judges, and the public at large tend to
overestimate dramatically either the level of cooperation required to
effectuate the goals of the community or the extent to which the
achievement of sufficient cooperation requires the stifling of dissent.
Disorienting disruptions of established patterns of thinking can
also bring about a shift in attitudes regarding toleration. A political
community that suddenly finds itself in a state of rapid change, or unsure of its policies due to inexplicable disappointments, may feel a special need to reaffirm its basic tenets, by coercing consensus if necessary.
Political disorientation can stem from diverse sources. A major frustration in foreign policy-victory in World War I followed by the "loss" of
Russia, victory in World War II followed by the "loss" of China-can
be one cause. A sudden disturbance of a comfortable way of life-the
challenge to racial hegemony in the South, the sudden loss of a cheap
and compliant labor supply in a bastion of industry-can be another.
Vivid reminders of a group's or nation's vulnerability can shake selfconfidence to a degree not remotely warranted by the actuality of the
threat posed; the response in Skokie, Illinois to the proposed Nazi
march 3 6 and the nation's response to the Hiss and Rosenberg cases
illustrate this phenomenon.3 7 A societal sense of bewilderment or vulnerability can engender pathology just as can the purposeful adoption
of an urgent agenda.
Important shifts of attitudes regarding dissent can result from inlieve About Civil Liberties 365-70 (1983); S. Stouffer, Communism, Conformity, and
Civil Liberties 100-03 (1966).
35. See Z. Chafee, supra note 14.
36. See D. Hamlin, The Nazi-Skokie Conflict: A Civil Liberties Battle (1980); A.
Neier, Defending My Enemy: American Nazis, the Skokie Case, and the Risks of Freedom (1979); Bollinger, supra note 9.
37. See W. Ewald, Who Killed Joe McCarthy? 63-66 (1984); W. Goodman, The
Committee 275-82 (1968); A. Weinstein, Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case 505-23
(1978).
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ternal political developments as well as external pressures and from
popular reactions that are less than traumatic. Some of the most serious Red-baiting of the post World War II period took place in 1947
and 1948-prior to the dramatic espionage revelations, prior to the triumph of the Communists in the Chinese Civil War, and prior to the
emergence of Senator McCarthy as a major political figure.38 A longstanding desire of conservatives to discredit the entrenched New Deal
bureaucracy apparently lay behind the various efforts during those
years to sensationalize the issue of Communist infiltration of American
institutions.3 9 The highly-charged hysteria of the Red Scare did not
last long; the dominant rhetoric of the early 1920's proclaimed a return
to "normalcy." Yet that period witnessed a massive campaign to exterminate the I.W.W. in California, 40 the emergence of the Ku Klux Klan
as an electoral force, 4 1 the Scopes trial, 4 2 and the successful culmination of the nativist campaign to exclude immigrants. 43 Tolerance
seems to be a somewhat cyclical phenomenon in politics. General weariness of dissent, or even the periodic ascendency of political factions
that simply do not value diversity and individuality, sometimes explains
why persons with unconventional views can be treated as curiosities
one day and scapegoats the next.
Some shifts of social or official attitudes are issue-specific. Because
of a certain experience, one or another type of liberty required by the
central norms of the first amendment may be viewed by an important
segment of the political community as too costly to be extended under
current conditions. That judgment need not spill over to other core
liberties. For example, one could decide that the power of the press to
disseminate information relating to national security must be severely
restricted without changing one's view at all regarding the tolerable
limits of revolutionary advocacy or organizational activity. Issue-specific shifts in basic attitudes about the core commitments of the first
amendment are likely to be rare-the forces that cause people to doubt
the efficacy of one form of speech will seldom have such a confined
impact-but when such shifts occur the situation can be regarded as
pathological with regard to the capacity of the constitutional regime to
abide by the particular core commitment that is the subject of the shift.
A doctrinal heritage fashioned to withstand that type of pathology, as
38. See W. Goodman, supra note 37, at 186-271.
39. See T. Reeves, The Life and Times ofJoe McCarthy 209-212 (1982); A. Theoharis, Seeds of Repression: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of McCarthyism 14-16
(1971).
40. See Z. Chafee, supra note 14, at 326-42.
41. See A. Rice, The Ku Klux Klan in American Politics 13-37 (1962); K. Jackson,
The Ku Klux Klan in the City 1915-1930, at 235-49 (1967).
42. Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927); see Kalven, A Commemorative Case Note: Scopes v. State, 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 505 (1960).
43. See J. Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism (1955).
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well as the more common form of broad-based pathology, is indicated
by my thesis.
As might have been expected, no formulaic definition of pathology
has emerged from this effort to consider the notion in detail. One cannot achieve much precision in identifying the causes, the symptoms, or
the antidotes of something so diffuse as a social pathology regarding
dissent. What does emerge from the foregoing observations is an emphasis on core commitments and attitude shifts, and a working definition of pathology that reflects that emphasis: A period is pathological
when social or political conditions in the relevant community (national,
regional, or local) generate a shift in attitudes regarding toleration that
places in jeopardy one or more of the commitments that comprise the
core of the first amendment.
We are now in a position to answer some of the definitional questions posed earlier. The degree of attitude change required to mark a
period as pathological has been infrequent but not truly rare in the
American experience; if the future resembles the past in this regard, a
limited but not minuscule portion of the time spectrum would be included in our conception of pathology. Both the breadth and intensity
of the shift toward an attitude of intolerance are relevant in determining whether a period is truly pathological. The apparent durability of
the consequences of any time-bound shift toward higher levels of intolerance is not a variable in the definition of pathology; durability is assumed. The attitudes that are the measure of pathology are those
regarding the social value of dissent, the moral claim to toleration in
general, and the inviolability of certain traditional rights of expression.
How people view novel, expansive claims of expressive liberty is of no
concern in identifying a period as pathological.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

Adoption of the pathological perspective would affect both the
methodological and the doctrinal dimensions of first amendment adjudication-both how judges reason about free speech as a general matter
and what specific doctrines and case outcomes courts decree. Neither
type of implication can be explored in a meaningful way, however, without first addressing some strategic considerations pertaining to the process by which abstract conceptions and priority judgments of the sort
generated by my thesis come to be translated into operational methodologies and doctrines, the working tools of the judge's trade.
A. Strategic Considerations
In deriving operational methodologies and doctrines from theoretical commitments, the analysis is predominantly instrumental. To develop the implications of my thesis, we must determine what judicial
methods and doctrines would best serve the objectives that have priority in light of the pathological perspective. As the preceding discussion
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indicates, the most important general objective is the strengthening,
during normal times as well as during pathological periods, of the central norms of the first amendment tradition. How is that strengthening
best accomplished?
It would be a mistake to assume that the strategy for protecting the
central norms of the first amendment must emphasize the tactic of doctrinal compulsion-the fashioning of specific, highly protective tests
that would bind lower courts and officials in times of stress. It is doubtful that legal standards could ever be designed with sufficient prescience and precision to achieve that type of behavioral effect to any great
degree. This is not to suggest that legal standards are likely to have no
or little impact in the worst of times, or that a focus on the fear of
pathology would not yield different standards than adjudication from
other perspectives. My only point here is that the process by which
courts influence future pathologies by means of adjudication in normal
times is complicated, and the formulation of legal standards that embody and are protective of the central norms of the first amendment is
only one, and probably not the most important, aspect of that process.
To understand what my thesis really would entail in the way of methodological and doctrinal implications, one must consider how the distinctive social dynamics of pathological periods bear on this question of
potential judicial impact.
The defining feature of a pathological period is a shift in basic attitudes, among certain influential actors if not the public at large, concerning the desirability of the central norms of the first amendment. It
seems evident, therefore, that one of the most important ways in which
adjudication in ordinary times might influence the course of pathology
would be by helping to promote an attitude of respect, devotion, perhaps even reverence, regarding those central norms. That is a goal not
easily achieved, for the capacity of judges to shape public attitudes is
extremely limited. On occasion, however, the bench can serve as a pulpit, and in the past the constitutional commandment to tolerate threatening ideas has been preached rather effectively by such eloquent
48
47
46
ministers as Holmes, 4 4 Brandeis, 45 Roberts, Black, and Stewart.
At least in this area of political controversy, skepticism regarding the
judicial capacity to influence attitudes should not deter judges from
seeking to instill in other members of the legal and political community
44. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925) (Holmes,J., dissenting); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
45. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
46. See, e.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (plurality opinion).
47. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971)
(Black, J., concurring); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 134 (1959) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
48. See, e.g., Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959) (Stewart, J.).
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an attitude of strong conviction regarding the enduring desirability and
importance of the central norms of the constitutional tradition. It may
seem a vacuous recommendation to urge upon judges the pursuit of
such an uncontroversial goal, but as I shall demonstrate later in this
section, 4 9 an emphasis on the inculcation of general attitudes may have
some notable implications regarding judicial methodology.
In addition to important shifts in attitudes about free speech, many
pathological periods are characterized by a sense of urgency stemming
from societal disorientation if not panic. Sometimes that sense of urgency unites otherwise antagonistic political factions and makes monolithic, speedy political responses feasible. Both the formal system of
checks and balances represented by the separation of powers and federalism and the informal system of checks and balances represented by
the conflicting objectives and priorities of interest groups exert much
less of a restraining influence under such conditions. Judicial methods
and doctrines designed to function well in the worst of times must take
into account that sense of urgency and the reduced effectiveness of
traditional checks. Those features of pathology suggest an emphasis in
adjudication during normal times on the development of procedures
and institutional structures that are relatively immune from the pressure of urgency by virtue of their formality, rigidity, built-in delays, or
strong internal dynamics. Substantive legal standards, no matter how
thoughtfully constructed, will probably be less resistent to that sort of
pressure than most procedures and many institutional structures.
A third common feature of a pathological period is a comparatively
high level of politicization regarding the question of toleration of dissent. Often because of a felt need for scapegoats, a substantial segment
of the political community focuses on the activities of dissenters and on
the response of government, including the courts, to those activities.
Courts are never wholly immune from political scrutiny, nor should
they be. In pathological periods, however, that scrutiny is intensified.
Methodologies and doctrines that may be efficacious for a judiciary operating with the degree of independence that prevails during normal
times may not work well for a judiciary that is subject to the political
pressures and constraints that characterize pathological periods. Methodologies and doctrines that assume less in the way of political independence may better serve the goals of the constitutional regime.
This survey of strategic considerations suggests that in our elaboration of methodological and doctrinal implications we should pay special attention to the inculcation of basic attitudes regarding free speech,
the development of procedures and institutional structures, and the impact of political pressures on the vindication of adjudicative authority.
Now it is time to put this strategic wisdom to work and determine what
49. See infra pp. 469-74, 478-79, 486, 488, 503.
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particular methodologies and doctrines would best equip the first
amendment to function in the worst of times.
B. Aethodological Implications
Legal reasoning patterns would be affected in a myriad of ways, at
many different levels, were the pathological perspective to become a
dominant feature of first amendment analysis. My thesis has implications regarding which justifications for a constitutional decision should
carry the most weight, what kinds of doctrinal standards should be preferred, how innovative courts should be in adapting the law of the first
amendment to changing conditions and perceptions, what range of
controversies relating to communication should be considered within
the ambit of first amendment concern, which issues should elicit a high
level ofjudicial involvement, and what social phenomena courts should
most take into account in resolving disputes over free expression.
1. Sources of Justification. - A preference for the pathological perspective should lead lawyers and judges to analyze modern issues with
reference to the central understandings of the constitutional framers
and the teachings of classic, time-honored precedents. The realization
that those sources of authority can be manipulated, and indeed cannot
be drawn upon at all without resort to contemporary perceptions and
preferences, 50 should not lead the legal culture to eschew reference to
the landmarks of the past. As a source both of rhetoric and understanding, those landmarks should be mined for all they are worth.
In pathological periods judicial authority is often threatened. The
mysterious admixture of respect, self-interest, fear, and inertia that typically leads persons and institutions to obey the dictates of courts is
disturbed. Under such conditions, courts need to be able to invoke
sources of authority that carry weight with unsophisticated, resistant
would-be regulators of speech. Rightly or wrongly, in our legal culture
the appeal to history and tradition, even to the legendary wisdom of the
Founding Fathers, seems to carry more weight than arguments from
philosophical first principles or from the implications of dynamic lines
of precedent. 51 Most of the time, the obedience calculus is not much
50. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
51. As Judge Bork has observed:
The Supreme Court regularly insists that its results, and most particularly its
controversial results, do not spring from the mere will of the Justices in the
majority but are supported, indeed compelled, by a proper understanding of
the Constitution of the United States. Value choices are attributed to the
Founding Fathers, not to the Court. The way an institution advertises tells you
what it thinks its customers demand.
Bork, supra note 27, at 3-4. It is striking how heavy is the reliance on history in the
Supreme Court opinions construing the first amendment that have proven to be the
most influential. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-77
(1964); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263-68 (1941); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496,
515-16 (1939); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713-20 (1931). Note-
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affected by what reasons judges cite for the results they decree. When
judicial authority is under serious challenge, however, those reasons
enter public debate and the appeal to history can be important. The
appeal to history is likely to be more convincing, moreover, if it is not
reserved for occasions when judicial authority is under challenge but
rather constitutes at all times a consistent feature in the interpretation
of the first amendment.
Respect for the understandings of the framers and for classic, timehonored precedents can also assume special importance in pathological
periods as the source of a stable perspective for judges who otherwise
would be swept up in the disoriented, fearful mentality of the times.
Pathological periods are characterized by the perception in some
quarters that pressing, unprecedented problems require an alteration
in normal patterns of tolerance. One function a constitutional tradition
can serve in such times is to institutionalize object lessons, to keep in
the forefront of public debate the memory of earlier eras when the
community's temporary loss of self-confidence engendered policies
that in retrospect seem benighted. In this regard, the thrust of constitutional rhetoric, and where possible doctrine as well, should be to emphasize the parallels between historical experiences, to distill "lessons"
of history as it were. 5 2 Necessarily, judicial reflections on the past offered in that spirit will be oversimplified. The purpose is not to control
the society's understanding of its past-no court, no matter how authoritative and respected, could achieve that objective-but to give officials and judges pause before they act on the assumption that the
unique character of the present threat requires a repudiation of traditional commitments.
Simplicity of analysis has yet another function under the pathological perspective. Even when addressing issues for which the original understanding and the classic precedents provide little guidance, courts
worthy in this regard is the rhetoric employed by Holmes and Brandeis in their classic
opinions on the subject of free speech. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("I wholly disagree with the argument of the Government that the First Amendment left the common law as to seditious libel in force. History seems to me against the notion. I had conceived that the United States through
many years had shown its repentence for the Sedition Act of 1798, by repaying fines that
it imposed."). In Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927), Brandeis attributed the powerful philosophical justification for free speech he expounded not to himself but to "[t]hose who won our independence. . . . They valued liberty both as an end
and as a means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the
secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you
Id. at
think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth.
375 (emphasis added).
52. A model ofjudicial reasoning in this respect is New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964) (drawing support from the fact that the attack on the validity of
the Sedition Act of 1798 has "carried the day in the court of history"); see Kalven, The
New York Times Case: A Note on The "Central Meaning of the First Amendment,"
1964 Sup. Ct. Rev. 191.
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that adopt the pathological perspective should search for methods of
justifying their judgments that appeal to the common, unsophisticated
understanding of what law is. Complicated, subtle, imaginative legal
arguments are not calculated to convince resistant officials and their
constituencies that tolerance of threatening dissenters is a constitutional imperative. In overheated periods what is needed is a style of
legal argumentation that appeals as little as possible to contemporary
judgments of priority or efficacy that many persons will dispute. Both
because judicial authority is threatened in times of stress and because
the most important phenomenon during such periods is a shift in attitudes, a judicial heritage targeted for the worst of times must speak to
persons who are neither first amendment specialists nor devotees. The
heritage must speak, moreover, in confident tones that do not invite
critical reflection and doubt regarding the importance of free speech.
The problem is that absent historical benchmarks that achieve their
simplicity by means of selective, romanticized retrospection, simplicity
of analysis is not easily achieved in the realm of first amendment adjudication. Over the years, Supreme Court justices have tried, collectively
and individually, to develop relatively simple tests and principles to
guide first amendment adjudication. There is good reason to believe
that courts, if not scholars, have long placed a premium on avoiding
over-complexity and over-refinement in this particular corner of constitutional law.5 3 At the moment, however, the endeavor has broken
down, and the doctrinal idiom abounds with talk of levels of scrutiny
and ambits of application.5 4 One perceptive observer has expressed
the fear that first amendment doctrine is beginning to rival the Internal
Revenue Code in its complexity. 55 I view the current state of affairs in
this regard with considerable apprehension, but I discern no simple
way to achieve simplicity of analysis. The two methodologies that have
been developed systematically in the service of that worthy goal, Hugo
57
Black's literalism 5 6 and Thomas Emerson's speech-action distinction,
58
have not survived critical scrutiny.
53. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (Black, J., concurring); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
54. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 104 S. Ct. 3065
(1984); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747
(1982); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
55. See Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 285, 309.
56. See Cahn & Black, Justice Black and First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public
Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 549 (1962).
57. See T. Emerson, supra note 14.
58. See, e.g., A. Meiklejohn, Political Freedom 21 (1960); Baker, Scope of the First
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. Rev. 964, 1009-12 (1978); BeVier, The
First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of
Principle, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 299, 306 (1978); Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First
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2. Preceptsand Principles.- From the standpoint of influencing attitudes regarding the desirability of free speech, we might begin the
quest for simplicity by recognizing the valuable role played by some of
the simple precepts of the judicial heritage. I have in mind well-worn
homilies such as: "the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones"; 5 9
"the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted
in the competition of the market"; 60 "debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"; 6' "[u]nder the first amendment
there is no such thing as a false idea"; 62 "[i]f there is any fixed star in
our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein"; 6 3 "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric."4 It is easy to
demonstrate how precepts such as these have questionable resolving
65
power in contested cases, and may even rest on disputable premises.
Nevertheless, simple precepts can have a strong intuitive appeal, and it
is just that kind of emotional force that may be most effective in reversing or containing the dangerous attitude shifts that take place in pathological periods. Were the grand, gallant, necessarily simple precepts of
the first amendment tradition to be abandoned, denigrated, or qualified
in the effort to achieve philosophical rigor or sensitivity to nuance, the
restraining power of that tradition in pathological periods would be
compromised.
Simple precepts are significant as a source both of rhetoric and
wisdom, but the search for simplicity cannot end there. In all but the
rarest of cases, even during pathological times, it would be disingenuous for a judge to claim that simple precepts dictated the result. I do
not think that disingenuous judicial behavior is indicated by my thesis.
There must be a middle ground methodologically between exclusive
reliance on simple precepts and resort to the enervating contingencies
and complexities of contemporary first amendment doctrine. The solution to this problem may lie in a renewed appreciation of the efficacy of
66
principles.
Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 Calif. L. Rev. 821 (1962); Scanlon, supra
note 33, at 207-08.
59. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
60. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
61. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
62. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
63. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
64. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
65. A perceptive critique of some of the standard precepts of the first amendment
tradition can be found in Bollinger, Free Speech and Intellectual Values, 92 Yale LJ.
438 (1983). For a careful demonstration that several of these precepts rest on dubious
philosophical underpinnings, see F. Schauer, supra note 14.
66. Though they do not agree completely on what principles are, Herbert Wechsler, Alexander Bickel, and Ronald Dworkin have each argued that judges must decide
constitutional cases largely on the basis of principles lest the courts' claim to resolve
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By a legal "principle" I mean a value proposition of sufficient generality and thrust that for a fair number of particular cases acceptance
or rejection of the proposition constitutes a major variable in determining how the case is resolved. 6 7 Familiar first amendment principles in69
68
clude the prohibitions against content distinctions, prior restraints,
70
restrictions analogous to seditious libel, and regulatory justifications
grounded in the paternalistic claim that audiences will act contrary to
their own best interests if exposed to certain arguments or information. 7 1 Excepting perhaps the antiseditious libel principle, none of
these principles is "absolute" in character in the sense that countervailing considerations cannot outweigh it. None is so precisely delimited that numerous, vexing definitional problems will not remain even
after the principle has been fully embraced and repeatedly applied. But
principles such as these have thrust: adoption of any one of them represents a notable value commitment that says much about how particular disputes will be adjudicated. In contrast, when first amendment
doctrine is fashioned in a different idiom such as a multi-factor balancing test, a multi-stage analysis with a threshold level-of-scrutiny determination, or a standard that is highly dependent on particularistic
assessments of motive, risk, or efficiency, adoption of the doctrinal
scheme in question does not provide a strong indication of how a particular dispute will be resolved.
The requirement that preferences be expressed in the idiom of
principles forces the integration of potentially divergent notions. That
process can demand a good deal of conceptual clarification and the
making of difficult judgments of compatibility and priority. A judge
who goes through that process is likely at the least to focus on the isconstitutional disputes founder on the shoals of the countermajoritarian difficulty. See
A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 49-65 (1962); R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 90-100 (1977); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1959). Critics, including Bickel in his later years, have objected that
judges cannot discharge anything like the adjudicative authority they have come to possess without utilizing thinking patterns that are more eclectic, diffuse, and flexible than
can be comprehended under a strict regime of principles. See A. Bickel, The Supreme
Court and the Idea of Progress (1970);J. Ely, supra note 5, at 54-60; Wright, Professor
Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition and the Supreme Court, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 769 (1971). I
have nothing to contribute to this familiar debate over methodological legitimacy. I do
believe, however, that the pathological perspective should lead one to favor on grounds
of efficacy an adjudicative method that emphasizes the role of principles, whether or not
one believes that some, perhaps even many, cases that simply must be resolved by courts
could never be decided on the basis of principles.
67. For an illuminating discussion of the concept of principle in legal reasoning,
see Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 982
(1978).
68. See Chicago Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
69. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
70. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
71. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748 (1976).
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sues in dispute and develop enough of a stake in the decision as not to
be swept along by first-level reactions. In times of pathology, it is just
those first-level reactions that corrupt adjudiction. A mode of analysis
that emphasizes principles, much like one that emphasizes history, can
broaden the perspective of the decisionmaker and make the regulatory
concerns of the moment seem less monumental. While other modes of
analysis also can have that effect depending on the factors they require
judges to consider, the idiom of principles is especially well suited to
the goal of broadening perspective. The effort to integrate complex
strands of analysis into a relatively concise proposition is, after all, an
exercise in simplification that exalts thrust and focus over qualification
and detail for the very purpose of dignifying and clarifying a value judgment. A legal culture that talks and thinks in terms of principles is
somewhat less likely, by virtue of that mode of discourse, to trivialize its
ideals in the process of case-by-case application, or lose the capacity to
subject its ad hoc, pragmatic impulses to some form of discipline.
3. Doctrinal Standards. - As indicated above, I view principles,
precepts, and historical benchmarks as more important weapons in the
battle against pathology than legal standards, despite the fact that by
their very nature principles, precepts, and lessons of history must be
more open-ended and less binding than at least some legal standards
can be. It would be wrong, however, to neglect completely the methodological implications of my thesis at the level of doctrinal standards.
In crafting standards to govern specific areas of first amendment
dispute, courts that adopt the pathological perspective should place a
premium on confining the range of discretion left to future decisionmakers who will be called upon to make judgments when pathological pressures are most intense. Constitutional standards that are
highly outcome-determinative of the cases to which they apply are thus
to be preferred. This observation would counsel against standards
such as the clear-and-present-danger test and its many variants that require in their application a contemporary assessment of social conditions. 72 More mechanistic measures for taking into account legitimate
regulatory interests are preferable from the pathological perspective.
Learned Hand's test in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten,73 which turns on
the meaning of the speaker's words rather than the quality of the dangers they create, is one example.
It may be objected that mechanistic, highly outcome-determinative
standards have the disadvantage of demarcating with relative clarity not
only what would-be regulators of speech cannot do but also what they
can do without fear of judicial invalidation. In pathological times, a
high degree of uncertainty regarding the exact boundaries of constitutional rights could be salutary because then the defenders of free
72. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Debs v. United States,
249 U.S. 211 (1919).
73. 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
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speech might have more opportunity to invoke arguments about the
meaning of the first amendment that derive at least a modicum of support from the state of judicial doctrine.
I am not swayed by this point for two reasons. First, I doubt that
during pathological periods arguments derived from relatively indeterminate legal doctrines carry much weight either in public or bureaucratic debate or in lower court adjudication. 74 When public anxieties
about the costs of toleration are high, defenders of free speech in these
various forums usually will have to couch their arguments in terms of
legal imperatives. Second, the dominant objective under the pathological perspective is to protect the central norms of the first amendment
tradition. The cost of clarity regarding legal standards is most likely to
be borne by those who advance novel, imaginative claims of liberty that
go beyond those central norms. Even when a mechanistic legal standard appears to invite some speech regulation, that invitation is not
likely to be read as extending to the very activities the standard was
designed to protect.
4. The Role of Innovation. - So far in this exploration of methodological implications, a focus on the worst of times seems to lead one
toward rather primitive styles of legal reasoning. First amendment doctrines should be historically grounded if possible. They should be simple. Judges should speak with deep conviction in confident, unqualified
tones. Legal standards should be mechanistic and highly outcome-determinative. These prescriptions smack of fundamentalism, and indeed
the opinions of Hugo Black come closest (though not all that close) to
satisfying the methodological ideal I have sketched. 75 Yet the great
benchmarks in the history of first amendment interpretation, the very
74. Lower courts presented with first amendment claims during the McCarthy Era
had recourse to a rich but indeterminate doctrinal heritage supporting the importance
of free speech and the right to advocate revolutionary doctrines. See, e.g., Herndon v.
Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Stromberg v.
California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). The classic separate opinions of Holmes and Brandeis
in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357
(1927), and Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), must also be counted as part of
that heritage. In the most significant lower court decisions of the McCarthy Era, the
indeterminate strands in Supreme Court doctrine that supported strong protection for
free speech had very little influence. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 183 F.2d 201 (2d
Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Marshall v. United States, 176 F.2d 473 (D.C. Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 933 (1950); Lawson v. United States, 176 F.2d 241 (D.C.
Cir. 1949); Morford v. United States, 176 F.2d 54 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd on other
grounds, 339 U.S. 258 (1950); Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948); Josephson v. United States, 165 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1947),
cert. denied, 333 U.S. 838 (1948).
75. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Mills v.
Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (Black,
J., concurring); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (Black, J., concurring); In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); Barenblatt v. United
States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250
(1952) (Black,J., dissenting); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (Black,J., dissent-
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benchmarks I would make the centerpiece of my doctrinal strategy,
have been instances of brilliant and highly sophisticated judicial inno-

vation. Holmes' dissents in Abrams 76 and Gitlow,77 Brandeis' concur-

rence in Whitney, 78 Roberts' plurality opinion in Hague v. CIO,7 9 and the
magisterial majority opinions in Near v. Minnesota,80 West Virginia Board
of Education v. Barnette,8 1 and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan8 2 were not
the outgrowths of a fundamentalist mentality. How then can I reconcile my respect for simplicity and tradition with my equally strong appreciation of the need for innovation? What exactly is the attitude
toward doctrinal innovation that should guide judges who interpret the
first amendment from the pathological perspective?
Plainly, relatively stable principles and standards are to be desired,
since the major task of restraining repression in the worst of times falls
to doctrines that were established in earlier, calmer eras. If the prevailing ethic were for legal doctrines to be reformulated at every turn,
there would be nothing to prevent timorous judges in pathological periods from employing their skills of creative analysis to lend sanction to
repressive government actions. So innovation inspired by a desire to
tailor doctrine to the perceived needs of the day would be discouraged
in a system targeted for the worst of times.
On the other hand, it is a challenging enterprise to fashion doctrine for the worst of times. Innovative engineering is almost certainly
required if the doctrinal product of normal times is to do service in
pathological periods. Basic liberties must not only be reaffirmed and
persuasively glorified; they must also be encased in a mantle of protective, derivative, and facilitative rights. The procedures for invoking first
amendment rights effectively may themselves have to be accorded constitutional stature, a notion that Henry Monaghan has persuasively developed.8 3 Long-term technological and sociological developments
must be taken into account in the formulation of principles and legal
standards if the central norms of the first amendment are to retain their
restraining power in a changing world. An indiscriminate disdain for
doctrinal innovation is not one of the implications of adopting the pathological perspective. A cautious, selective approach to innovation is.
5. The Ambit of First Amendment Coverage. - This concern about innovation surfaces in another way. One strategy for combatting the
stresses of pathological periods would be to extend first amendment
ing); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
76. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
77. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
78. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
79. 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (plurality opinion).
80. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
81. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
82. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
83. See Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 Harv. L. Rev. 518 (1970).
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protection as widely, fully, and creatively as possible in normal times so
that the retrenchments that might be demanded in the worst of times
would sacrifice only doctrinal fat. But since judicial credibility cannot
be taken for granted in pathological periods, that strategy could be
counterproductive. Better equipped for the storms of pathology might
be a lean, trim first amendment that covered only activities most people
would recognize as serious, time-honored forms of communication.
It is an intriguing and difficult question, well worth pausing over,
whether adoption of the pathological perspective should lead courts to
favor an expansive or a narrowly confined but heavily fortified set of
first amendment principles. The question has implications for a wide
variety of disputes. Should commercial advertising be included under
the umbrella of the first amendment?8 4 Symbolic conduct?8 5 Is the expenditure of personal funds on a political campaign, one's own or another's, a first amendment activity?8 6 Are vivid depictions of genitalia
in action instances of the expression about which the first amendment
is concerned?8 7 What about the sale or rental of mechanisms such as
in the hands of users can stimulate a form of cognitive
video games that
88
engagement?
An expansive first amendment that extended to all such activities
would have certain advantages in periods of pathology. Most significant would be the absence of any tradition of courts making value-laden
distinctions among acts of communication based on prescriptive notions of how communicators should influence their audiences. To exclude commercial speech and obscenity from the ambit of first
amendment concern-even to accord such forms of expression a diminished level of protection-it is necessary to look beyond the form of
the communication (words, pictures) and find something in its subject
matter, type of impact on recipients, or the motivation of its disseminators, that distinguishes it from the communications that warrant full
first amendment protection. Symbolic conduct, money contributions,
and games differ in form from words and pictures, but their impact and
the motivation for their creation may be comparable (disseminating a
view of the world, provoking a cognitive response). Courts working
within a first amendment tradition that authorized judicial inquiry into
motivation, impact, and form would be tempted in pathological periods
to find something distinctive in the speech of the most unpopular dissenters (concerted or surreptitious conduct, indoctrination, nihilistic moti84. See Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a
General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1212 (1983).
85. See Note, Symbolic Conduct, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 1091 (1968).
86. See Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 Yale L.J. 1001
(1976).
87. See Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1.
88. See Note, The First Amendment Side Effects of Curing Pac-Man Fever, 84
Colum. L. Rev. 744 (1984).
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vation, coercive or selective impact) that would place it outside the
ambit of first amendment protection. An expansive tradition regarding
the reach of the first amendment would make it more difficult for
judges to invoke such characteristics as a basis for suppressing speech.
Other considerations also favor an expansive conception of the
first amendment as a preparation for pathology. The more universal a
principle, the broader is the constituency of persons who gain from the
principle. Political dissenters may benefit from finding themselves in
the same boat with commercial advertisers, campaign contributors, and
filmmakers interested in artistic freedom. There may also be a "muscle
tone" argument for expanding the ambit of first amendment concern.
In normal times, the bulk of disputes will not be over restrictions on
speech growing out of political movements but over the conflicts that
are endemic to everyday life, especially everyday economic life. A first
amendment that figures in adjudication only rarely may not develop the
doctrinal refinements, and the specialized bar, that may be needed in
times of pathology.
The foregoing arguments, while not conclusive on the question,
carry some weight. I am not impressed, however, by the argument that
the first amendment should be construed expansively in normal times
so as to provide judges with fodder for concessions that might be demanded by insistent political forces in pathological periods. Admittedly, doctrinal retrenchments can occasionally defuse demands to
repress speech with6ut seriously undermining the expressive liberties
in dispute. The Supreme Court's 1973 reformulation of the test for
obscenity89 appears to have had just such an effect, at least for a time.
In pathological periods, however, concessions are more likely to stimulate than forestall demands for further repression. It is a shift in attitudes regarding the desirability of free speech that marks a period as
pathological. Judicial retrenchments that authorize a break with tradition in the direction of permitting greater regulation of speech can only
serve to legitimate such an attitude shift, no matter how insignificant in
the grand scheme of things the particular speech in dispute may be.
In fact, a focus on the role of concessions suggests a stringent
rather than expansive approach to the question of coverage. In pathological periods, courts need to present the forces of repression with
strict, immutable legal constraints. That kind of implacable judicial
posture is easier to assume when the basic reach of the first amendment
is modest and compatible with widely shared intuitions regarding the
natural ambit of the commitment to expressive liberty. If courts are
ever to contribute to the stemming of destructive political tides, what
judges say must ring true, at some level of consciousness, with the most
influential shapers of public opinion. Just as history, simplicity, and a
89. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973).
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sense of conviction can enhance the intuitive appeal of judicial pronouncements, modesty of reach can be an important factor in the credibility calculus.
Probably the strongest argument for a lean first amendment derives from considerations more internal to the adjudicative process.
There appears to be a close correlation between the ambit of coverage
and the ability of courts to keep doctrine simple, informed by tradition,
and dominated by principles. The wider the reach of first amendment
coverage, the greater seems to be the judicial affinity for instrumental
reasoning, balancing tests, differential levels of scrutiny, and pragmatic
judgments.9 0 For the reasons spelled out above, within any given area
of doctrinal formulation courts that adopt the pathological perspective
should strive to emphasize the role of tradition, simple precepts, and
principles. The feasibility of that demand will depend in part on how
numerous and various are the disputes for which doctrine must be
formulated.
To my mind, the arguments just developed for a carefully confined
ambit of first amendment protection outweigh those presented earlier
for a more expansive view of expressive liberty. Adoption of the pathological perspective should lead courts to think carefully before extending the protective principles of the first amendment to types of
communication that have not traditionally been considered essential to
the maintenance of an open society. That does not mean that the ambit
of first amendment concern should remain fixed. As recently as 1957
our first amendment tradition did not protect the freedom to form
political associations or the freedom to speak anonymously. 9 1 The constitutional right to resist wide-ranging interrogation regarding one's
political beliefs was not established until the 1960s, if then.9 2 The coverage of the first amendment must continue to develop. But the pathological perspective counsels that this development will best serve the
constitutional regime if it proceeds cautiously, with careful attention to
the costs of expanding the amendment's reach. Those costs seem highest when the activities encompassed by a doctrinal innovation bear little
intuitive resemblance in terms of social function or moral significance
to the activities that have been at the center of the traditional under90. For examples of these modes of analyses achieving prominence at the outer
ambit of first amendment concern, see Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,
104 S. Ct. 3065 (1984); Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981); Central

Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); California
Medical Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182 (1981). On the relationship

between breadth of coverage and strength of protection for the principle of free speech,
see F. Schauer, supra note 14, at 134-35.
91. Those rights were established respectively in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
(1958), and Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
92. See DeGregory v. Attorney Gen. of New Hampshire, 383 U.S. 825 (1966); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
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standing of the first amendment. We must constantly take care not to
trivialize the meaning of free speech. 9 3 Particularly to be avoided is the
attitude, all too prevalent in our recent constitutional experience, that
doctrinal expansion is a good in itself, that creative analogy is its own
94
reward.
6. Prioritiesof Doctrinal Involvement. - The conclusion that judicial
innovation must be rationed sugests a rather deliberate approach to
determining what might be called the priorities of doctrinal involvement. It is the case that the annotated first amendment contains numerous decisions on the subject of advocacy of revolution 95 but very
few on the structure of the mass communications industry, 96 many decisions about the privacy rights of government employees 9 7 but few
about the interplay of copyright and free speech, 98 many cases on the
right to distribute leaflets in public places9 9 but few on the right to be
free from ideological indoctrination by government.' 0 0 Patterns such
as these can be explained to some degree by theoretical priorities, and
perhaps to a greater degree by the nature of the social conflicts that
have spurred disputants to invoke the first amendment. It would be a
mistake, however, to assume that the role of courts is entirely passive
regarding the priorities of doctrinal involvement. In fashioning principles and standards, judges do more than determine how contested
cases are resolved. How the principles and standards are fashioned
also influences what types of disputes and aspirations develop into contested cases, one of the most important determinants of any doctrinal
tradition.
The pathological perspective brings to the fore certain considerations that ought to influence which types of free speech disputes generate a high level of doctrinal involvement. It will be recalled that one
common feature of a pathological period is a sense of urgency that
weakens normal mechanisms of checks and balances.101 When that dynamic operates, methods of speech regulation that can be rapidly mo93. On this trivialization phenomenon, see Nagel, How Useful Is Judicial Review in

Free Speech Cases?, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 302, 329-34 (1984).

94. For development of this theme, see Monaghan, supra note 5; Nagel, Book Re-

view, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1174 (1979) (reviewing L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law
(1978)).

95. See W. Lockhart, Y. Kamisar &J. Choper, Constitutional Rights and Liberties
273-91, 295-306, 325-53, 361-75 (5th ed. 1981) (collecting cases).

96. See, e.g., I. Pool, Technologies of Freedom (1983).
97. See W. Lockhart, Y. Kamisar &J. Choper, supra note 95, at 409-22 (collecting
cases).
98. See, e.g., Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on
the Protection of Expression, 67 Calif. L. Rev. 283 (1979).
99. See Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 1, 14-21.
100. See, e.g., M. Yudof, When Government Speaks (1983); Shiffrin, Government
Speech, 27 UCLA L. Rev. 565 (1980).
101. See supra pp. 463-64, 467-68.
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bilized and/or implemented on a broad scale become far more
threatening to first amendment values than is true in normal times,
when the pace and scope of regulation are constrained by countervailing forces and institutional dynamics. Thus, such regulatory techniques as licensing systems, injunctions, subpoenas, record keeping,
and seizures of persons and materials deserve special attention in light
of the pathological perspective. The strong presumption against prior
restraint, for example, may be defensible only by virture of its efficacy
10 2
in the worst of times.
My thesis also has implications regarding how receptive courts
should be to claims that challenge structural arrangements rather than
discrete actions or policies. Judicial interpretation of the first amendment has done little to influence the institutional structures that determine what Americans read and hear.' 0 3 Occasionally, notions of
journalistic autonomy 10 4 or academic freedom' 0 5 creep into court
opinions, but seldom in ways that suggest a major influence on the resolution of the case, let alone impact on the future development of institutional structures. Yet the quality of public debate and private inquiry
has been affected enormously by the way educational and mass communications institutions have evolved. There are of course serious, perhaps insurmountable, limitations on the capacity of courts to shape the
society at that level. The effort to do so, moreover, may be in tension
with the important methodological goal of simiplicity of analysis: how
could the idiom of principles ever suffice, for example, to determine the
basic structure of the telecommunications industry? Despite these
powerful constraints, adoption of the pathological perspective suggests
a certain priority of doctrinal involvement regarding institutional structures. Those structures do much to shape the social dynamics of stressful times, yet are for the most part sturdier, less easily abandoned or
eviscerated, than legal standards and principles, and thus constitute a
stronger potential source of stability and restraint. Particularly when
the sacrifice in doctrinal simplicity is not prohibitive-as it need not be
with the recognition of various rights of institutional autonomy but
surely would be with the effort to draw out of the first amendment
norms of distributive justice regarding communicative power and opportunity' 0 0--the pathological perspective counsels a methodological
emphasis on institutional structures.
102. I have developed this idea in Blasi, Prior Restraint, supra note 7, at 55.
103. See I. Pool, supra note 96.
104. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co.v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); CBS
v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
105. See, e.g., Healy v.James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589 (1967); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,

concurring).
106. Compare Blasi, 'Journalistic Autonomy" as a First Amendment Concept in In
Honor of Justice Douglas (R. Keller ed. 1979) (journalistic autonomy instrumental to
fundamental first amendment checking value), with Barron, Access to the Press-A New
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7. Social Phenomena to be Taken into Account. - Some free speech issues assume special significance in pathological periods because of the
radiating impact any judicial decision may have on private as well as
official patterns of behavior. Shifts in attitudes regarding the moral imperative of tolerance are especially important in times of pathology,
and the high degree of politicization that often surrounds constitutional adjudication on such occasions tends to augment the symbolic
impact of what both courts and regulatory officials say and do about
dissent. As a result, courts that adopt the pathological perspective
should be predisposed to develop doctrines that might affect the way
discretionary patterns of private and official behavior influence the general level of expression and inquiry.
The familiar and oft-criticized chilling effect doctrine, 10 7 which
holds that fearful and overly risk-averse reactions of potential speakers
to a particular type of regulatory authority must be considered in the
constitutional calculus, represents one example of such a doctrine. The
chilling effect doctrine is unsatisfying in its reliance on crude behavioral
speculation and in its tendency to be indiscriminately employed both by
judges and advocates. The pathological perspective cautions us not to
be swept away by those undesirable features of the doctrine. In the
worst of times, the chilling effect is a phenomenon of surpassing significance. It is no coiricidence that the chilling effect doctrine was forged
in the judicial effort to repudiate McCarthyism' 0 8 and forestall repression of the civil rights movement1 0 9 and has lost much of its appeal in
the calmer times since.
Another social phenomenon that is especially important from the
standpoint of the pathological perspective is legitimation. As Charles
Black has noted,'1 0 courts may have their greatest impact not when
they invalidate legislation but when they uphold it. A major function of
judicial review is to legitimate the actions of government-to explain
their fidelity to basic traditions and principles, to assuage constitutional
doubts that could hamper the enforcement or extension of the disputed
policies. In the context of controversies over the regulation of speech,
legitimation is a dangerous phenomenon. When other social dynamics
generate demands for repression, a judicial green light can intensify
those demands. Even abstact ideas or concessions that add balance to a
libertarian tradition in normal times-the idea, for instance, that speech
First Amendment Right, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1641 (1967) (courts and perhaps Congress
should fashion first amendment right of access to press).
107. See Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling
Effect," 58 B.U.L. Rev. 685 (1978); Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69
Colum. L. Rev. 808 (1969).
108. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
354 U.S. 234 (1957).
109. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Bates v. City of Little
Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
110. See C. Black, The People and the Court 56-86 (1960).

1985]

PATHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

483

can be regulated when the danger is great enough,"' or that reckless
falsehoods are not within the ambit of protected expression' ' 2-may
have adverse consequences by virtue of their legitimating function in
pathological times.
This is not to say that the choice of the pathological perspective
implies that regulatory interests should never be considered in the process of doctrinal formulation. Absolutism at that methodological level,
as contrasted with an occasional preference for unqualified principles
or standards on tactical grounds, cannot be justified under any plausible view of the process of constitutional interpretation." 13 The pathological perspective does suggest, however, that the dynamics of
legitimation, not just the immediate impact of a regulation viewed in
isolation, should determine how regulatory interests are taken into account in first amendment adjudication.
A doctrine has an undesirable legitimating effect when it does
more than simply fail to restrain pathological assaults on the central
norms of the first amendment but actually stimulates or sustains those
assaults. It is difficult to predict which judicial doctrines are likely to
have that kind of impact. One strong candidate for condemnation from
the standpoint of the legitimation phenomenon would seem to be any
doctrine that directs courts to focus on the quality or quantity of danger
generated by dissenting speech.11 4 Dissent can create dangers, and the
avoidance of certain dangers can be a legitimate regulatory interest.' 15
But the effect of the clear-and-present-danger test has been to promulgate the view that the nature of the danger generated by certain forms
of speech constitutes the dominant, indeed sole, determinant of first
amendment protection.' 16 Such a legitimation of risk aversion can only
widespread worry
lend support to the forces of repression in timesl of
7
society."
the
to
threats
external
or
internal
about
Concern about the dynamics of legitimation in pathological periods also explains why the natural, and indeed often rational, social impulse to enforce canons of good taste must not be permitted to serve as
111. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
112. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
113. See M. Nimmer, supra note 14, §§ 2.01-2.03 (1984) (discussion of absolutism
and balancing).
114. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652 (1925); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
115. For a trenchant critique of the view that speech deserves extraordinary immunity from regulation because it seldom generates significant harms, see F. Schauer,
supra note 14, at 7-12.
116. The Supreme Court's current standard for determining whether subversive
advocacy is protected by the first amendment is not a danger test as such because in
addition to the likelihood that the speech will cause lawless action, courts must also
consider whether the speech is "directed to" that end. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444 (1969).
117. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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a justification for speech regulation.' 1 8 Particularly when a political
community feels threatened, persons who challenge prevailing standards of taste come to be viewed as alien, unsocialized, ill-motivated, in
some ways even subhuman. The legitimation of regulation on grounds
of taste would reinforce those attitudes and thereby support one of the
strongest causes of the intolerance of unorthodox ideas.
C. DoctrinalImplications
The pathological perspective is not a formula for deciding particular cases or generating specific doctrines. Many considerations other
than the choice of perspective go into determining what legal standard
should govern any given dispute, as well as how such a dispute should
be resolved under the applicable standard. Nevertheless, some exploration of the more concrete implications of my thesis seems necessary
before it can be properly evaluated. My aim here is to identify the ways
in which a conscious adoption of the pathological perspective would
influence the development of first amendment doctrine in some areas
of important modem controversy.
1. Commercial Advertising. - In the last decade, the Supreme Court
has held, first, that commercial advertising is entitled to the protection
of the first amendment 1 9 and, second, that the level of first amendment protection accorded commercial advertising should not be as
great as that accorded most forms of noncommercial speech that qualify for first amendment protection. 120 In accepting the first proposition, the Justices were strongly influenced by their distaste for the
paternalistic nature of the rationale for regulating certain advertising:
consumers, it was claimed, would make ill-advised choices regarding
prescription drugs and legal services if exposed to advertising by high
volume-low service entrepreneurs.' 2 ' In accepting the second proposition, the Court cited the comparative hardiness of speech prompted by
the profit motive and the comparative narrowness of the first amendment interests served by commercial advertising. 122 A four-step test
was adopted by the Court to govern disputes over commercial advertising. That test requires courts to decide, among other things, whether
the advertisement is more likely to mislead than inform and whether
prohibition of the advertisement "directly advance[s]" a substantial
government interest.1 23
118. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). For a vigorous challenge to the
majority's reasoning in Cohen, and to the claim advanced in the text, see Nagel, supra
note 93, at 324-26.
119. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748 (1976).
120. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
121. Virginia State Board, 425 U.S. at 769-70.
122. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 n.6.
123. Id. at 564.
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The middle-of-the-road approach adopted by the Court in this
area is undesirable from the standpoint of the pathological perspective.
Under current doctrine, judges are expected as a routine matter to assess the potential of commercial advertising to mislead audiences even
when it is not inaccurate in any demonstrable, objective sense. 124 That
judges view such a task as normal in the commercial realm does not
mean that they will feel free in every setting to consider how speech
might mislead audiences; the situations are distinguishable. Nonetheless, one has to wonder whether in times of stress, when a diminution in
societal self-confidence may generate concern about the ill effects of
"misleading" speech in the political realm, the precedent from the area
of commercial speech will not help to weaken the taboo against case-bycase judicial evaluation of the "truth" of unpopular political
expression.
Apart from that threshold inquiry into potential deceptiveness, the
Court's doctrine regarding commercial speech is troublesome in its legitimation of an ad hoc balancing methodology. Any ad hoc assessment of the benefits and costs of speech that is made during
pathological times is bound to be tilted in the direction of regulation;
that is an inevitable consequence of the shift in attitudes regarding the
25 Of
desirability of free speech that characterizes such periods.'
course, ad hoc balancing has long been an integral feature of first
amendment doctrine for many types of disputes.' 2 6 The realistic goal
must be to contain such balancing, not eliminate it; even Justice Black
recognized in disputes over the timing and location of demonstrations
an appropriate sphere for a case-by-case judicial comparison of communicative and regulatory interests. 1 27 The problem with the Court's
decisions regarding commercial speech is that they constitute a
counter-example to what has been the most widely recognized principle
for containing the methodology of balancing-that ad hoc balancing is
only appropriate when the costs generated by speech are not a function
of the speaker's message but rather arise in some other manner as when
a meeting or protest march displaces competing uses of public property.' 28 Again, the exception to this principle could be confined to the
realm of commercial speech; there are some features of commercial
124. See, e.g., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
125. A good example of such a balancing effort in a pathological context is American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950), in which the Court upheld a
requirement that officers of labor unions file non-Communist affidavits.
126. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 104 S. Ct. 3065
(1984); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per
curiam); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Cox v.
New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
127. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 102-04 (1949) (Black,J., dissenting).
128. For elaborations of this distinction, see Ely, supra note 24; Stone, supra note
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speech that distinguish it from all other types of communication. 129
But a court operating in pathological times that views the dangers generated by an unpopular speaker's message as "substantial" and "disproportionate" to the value of the message might be sorely tempted to
carve out a second exception to the principle against message
balancing.
Even if the judgments that have been legitmated for commercial
speech disputes were never transplanted to other areas of first amendment controversy, the Court's decision to accord commercial speech an
intermediate level of protection may have other costs from the standpoint of the pathological perspective. Commercial advertising was
never a concern in any of the historic political struggles over freedom
of expression. The first amendment claimants in disputes over commercial advertising often are sophisticated and driven by the profit motive. The speech in question is brief and intended to evoke a reflexive,
even if somewhat delayed, response from listeners. There is a strong
tradition of government regulation of advertising and, in the federal
government and most states, an administrative regulatory apparatus in
place. These considerations suggest that no first amendment doctrine
protecting commercial speech could be either uncomplicated or historically grounded. Perhaps more important, it seems unquestionable that
any such doctrine would undercut for a substantial segment of the population the belief that first amendment freedoms represent a noble
commitment well worth preserving even in the face of serious anxieties,
risks, and costs. The best preparation for pathology is widespread conviction about the importance of free speech. The spectacle of voluminous litigation over degrees of suggestiveness in product advertising,
conducted in the name of the first amendment, is likely to weaken that
conviction.
Thus, in several respects adoption of the pathological perspective
should lead one to doubt the wisdom of treating commercial advertising as any different than fighting words, deliberate lies, hard-core pornography, or threats-categories of communication that are regarded
as simply outside the ambit of first amendment concern. 1 3 0 On the
other hand, the decision to view commercial advertising as worthy of
first amendment protection may strengthen one of the most appealing
129. Commercial advertising is formulated with the aim of inducing a very specific
behavioral response that would redound to the economic profit of the "speaker." Save

perhaps political advertising, no other form of speech draws upon such voluminous data
regarding patterns of audience response and is so systematically tailored to achieve the
desired effect. For no other form of speech are there comparable economic pressures
on the speakers to succeed in inducing their audiences to respond in the desired way.
Few if any other forms of speech involve messages on subjects about which the speakers
are so much more knowledgeable than their audiences.
130. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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and straightforward of free speech principles, that the regulation of
communication can never be based on the judgment that audiences will
be better off if kept ignorant of certain advocacy or information they
may be incapable of properly evaluating. 13 ' This antipaternalism principle surely would be a candidate for a central place in a simple,
straightforward, principle-based doctrinal tradition of the sort favored
under the pathological perspective. In striking down state prohibitions
on accurate price advertising by pharmacists and lawyers, the Court explicitly inveighed against the paternalistic premises of the restrictions,
principle a position of new prominence
thus giving the antipaternalism
5 2
in first amendment doctrine.'
There can be little doubt that a strong tradition of disallowing paternalistic rationales for the regulation of speech would be a constraining force in a pathological period. A common source of anxiety
regarding the dangers of speech is the belief that audiences cannot
properly evaluate the passionate appeals of disaffected demagogues.
Regulatory efforts that spring from that anxiety have an unmistakably
paternalistic character. One must ask, however, how much the antipaternalism principle has been strengthened by the Court's invocation
of the principle in commercial speech cases. The net effect of the
Court's response to paternalism in the regulation of advertising may
actually have been to dilute the principle that audience ignorance can
never be considered a virtue.
Just four years after the Court embraced the antipaternalism principle in the drug advertising case, the Justices declared in dictum that
the harm of consumers being made indifferent to energy conservation
as a result of advertising by a public utility promoting electricity con13 3
sumption provided a valid ground for prohibiting such advertising.
The cases can be reconciled: the claim of the regulators in the drug
and lawyer advertising cases was that consumers would be influenced
by the advertising to act against their own self-interest; in the promotional advertising case, the fear was that consumers would act against
the public interest in pursuit of their own short range self-interest. The
rationale in the first type of case is more paternalistic because it necessarily assumes that listeners cannot evaluate the message even when
they have every incentive to try to do so. The rationale in the promotional advertising case is consistent with respect for the messagescreening capacities of listeners; what the rationale doubts is the capac131. For a systematic defense of this antipaternalism principle, see Scanlon, supra
note 58. But see Scanlon, Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 519, 532-34 (1979).
132. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 375 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Phar-

macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 769-70 (1976); see also
Linmark Assocs., Inc. v Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1977) (extending antipaternal-

ism principle beyond context of price advertising).
133. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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ity of listeners to behave as public-spirited citizens when prompted to
act selfishly by sophisticated advertising techniques. In pathological
times, however, it is this last form of distrust of audiences that is most
likely to surface as a rationale for regulating speech. And there is good
reason to suspect that a lack of enthusiasm concerning the social value
of commercial advertising had something to do with the Court's willingness to countenance the kind of paternalism that was at issue in the
utility advertising case.1 3 4 Had the Court worked through the implications of the antipaternalism principle in some other realm of free
speech controversy, a more robust principle would probably have
emerged.
These speculations suggest at the least that adoption of the pathological perspective counsels against the Court's middle-of-the-road approach to commercial speech. Either no first amendment protection
for commercial speech or fuller protection is indicated. But which is it?
The no-protection alternative gains support from the general
methodological preference for a lean, trim first amendment and from
the concern about weakening public respect for the first amendment by
bringing under its umbrella some forms of communication commonly
perceived as manipulative and unimportant. But the exclusion of commercial advertising from the first amendment's ambit would place
courts in the position of denying protection based on a judicial characterization (and denigration) of the motivations of the speaker and/or
the importance of the subject of the communication. From the standpoint of the pathological perspective, it would be best if the judicial
system never made such category judgments, for they are judgments
that will not be made carefully and fairly in times of stress. Both the
no-protection approach and thi current middle-level approach require
that "commercial speech" be defined, identified, and accorded less protection than noncommercial speech. In contrast, were commercial
speech to be treated the same as political speech, courts would not have
to pass judgment on the worth of the speaker's motivation or message.
On balance, I think adoption of the pathological perspective constitutes a reason to exclude commercial advertising from the protection
of the first amendment. Category judgments supporting exclusions of
other sorts-for fighting words and threats, for example-are entrenched in the first amendment tradition and will remain so whatever
is done about commercial advertising. Were courts to grant commercial speech the same high level of protection now accorded political
speech, regulatory objectives long considered important and legitimate
would be frustrated, engendering in all probability a weakening of public respect for the first amendment quite a bit more severe than that
now caused by the Court's middle-of-the-road approach. Many other
considerations must be taken into account in determining the exact
134. Id. at 561-63.
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constitutional status of commercial advertising, but from the pathological perspective the burden of persuasion should be on those who would
bring that category of communication anywhere within the ambit of
first amendment concern.
2. The Right to Know. - If the right to speak is important in large
part because of the benefits audiences derive from the information and
ideas disseminated by speakers, then a right of potential speakers "to
know," that is to have access to noteworthy information and events,
would seem a natural complement to the right to speak.13 5 There is no
shortage of rhetoric in the first amendment tradition extolling the right
to know,' 36 but only recently has that rhetoric ripened into judicial doctrine. The Court has granted journalists a constitutional right of access
to various trial proceedings' 3 7 and a highly contingent right to investigate certain prison conditions, 138 but those rights have been extended
cautiously and with great attention to limiting principles.
In recognizing a first amendment right to observe criminal trials,
the Court placed heavy reliance on the Anglo-American tradition of
open courtrooms. 139 The functional importance to the democratic
process of the information the plaintiffs sought to obtain was not emphasized, quite plainly for fear that a functional right to know would
intrude into many areas of government decisionmaking not marked by
a tradition of openness.' 40 In the prison access cases, the Court made
the journalists' right to know dependent on the degree of access volun135. See Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 Wash. U.L.Q.
634.
136. Perhaps the best known item in that tradition is Madison's observation: "A
popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a
Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both." 9 Writings ofJames Madison 103
(G. Hunt ed. 1910); see also Emerson, supra note 135 (collecting authorities); infra note
146 (listing examples of right to know rhetoric).
137. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 104 S.Ct. 819 (1984); Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality opinion).
138. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978). The Court divided three-onethree, with Justice Stewart writing the pivotal opinion. He read the first amendment to
require that the public and press be granted "equal access once government has opened
its doors." Id. at 16 (StewartJ, concurring). He concluded that the obligation to grant
equal access entailed some effort by prison officials to accommodate the special professional needs ofjournalists, such as for interviews with prisoners on a flexible schedule
and opportunities to use cameras and sound recording equipment.
139. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564-75 (1980) (plurality opinion).
140. Id. at 576 n. 11. Even Justice Brennan, who has argued for a "structural" theory of the first amendment, see Address, 32 Rutgers L. Rev. 173 (1979), expressed concern regarding the right to know that "the stretch of this protection is theoretically
endless ...." Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 588 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting
Address, 32 Rutgers L. Rev. at 177). He concluded that the right to know "must be
invoked with discrimination and temperance," id., and observed that "[t]he case for a
right of access has special force when drawn from an enduring and vital tradition of
public entree to particular proceedings or information." Id. at 589.
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tarily granted by prison officials to the public at large. 141 The Justices
even left open the issue whether a prison could be sealed off entirely
from public scrutiny as a routine matter. This ambivalent and tentative
attitude toward the right to know also seems to have played a part in
the Court's unsympathetic response to the claim ofjouralists to first
amendment protection from subpoenas inquiring into confidential relationships with news sources.1 4 2 It is evident that the Court views a first
amendment right to know as potentially important in certain situations
but so expansive in nature as to be viewed with the greatest suspicion.
Many of the concerns that make first amendment protection for
commercial speech problematic from the standpoint of the pathological
perspective also operate with regard to the right to know. Important,
time-honored regulatory interests compete with the desire of inquisitive journalists and citizens to learn all they can. It is difficult to imagine how an expansive right to know could be implemented without
some form of ad hoc balancing comparing in each particular context
the estimated importance of the sought-after information with competing values of personal privacy, comprehensive and undistorted recordkeeping, and candid counsel. Because disputes over the right to know
often concern efforts to monitor and criticize the conduct of government, the legitimation of ad hoc balancing and judicial assessments of
speech value in this realm could be invoked to justify the use of those
analytic techniques in other types of disputes relating to the criticism of
government. And precisely because the comparative importance of
knowledge and secrecy varies greatly from one setting to another, one
despairs of developing a set of stable, concise principles to govern adjudication regarding the right to know. In the absence, moreover, of
highly outcome-determinative principles, the amount of adjudication
over claims of access to information is likely to be considerable, with
the attendant cost of trivializing the first amendment.
To this point, the analysis parallels that developed previously regarding commercial advertising. However, the right to know differs
from the right to advertise in at least one significant respect: some propositions that fall under the rubric of the right to know may qualify as
core commitments of the first amendment.
That is not a self-evident contention. The process by which certain
propositions achieve the status of core commitments is evolutionary in
nature and determined largely by judgments made in response to the
press of events. 14 3 Only recently has the right to know received more
than passing attention in the realm of first amendment adjudication.
The Supreme Court decisions recognizing rights to attend various trial
proceedings represent a major development, 144 but it is doubtful that
141.
142.
143.
144.

Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 16 (1978).
See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
See supra text preceding note 14.
See cases cited supra note 137. For a valuable analysis of the implications of
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cases so recent and so tentative in their reasoning should be regarded
as establishing the right to know as a core commitment of the first
amendment.
On the other hand, basic assumptions that over time have shaped
adjudication and public debate can achieve the status of core commitments before they are explicitly validated by judicial decision. It is
noteworthy how careful courts have always been, even when rejecting
specific right to know contentions, not to question the assumption that
the first amendment is implicated when the government interferes with
efforts by private citizens to gather information.1 45 The very familiarity
of right to know rhetoric suggests, moreover, that in public debate it
has long been assumed that the first amendment commands some measure of openness in government.' 46 That the institution ofjudicial rethose cases, see Note, Access to Pretrial Documents Under the First Amendment, 84
Colum. L. Rev. 1813 (1984).
145. Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 586 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
concurring). The closest the Court has come to denying the existence of a right to know
is Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965), which upheld the Secretary of State's refusal to
validate passports for travel to Cuba. Petitioners claimed that the refusal deprived them
of their first amendment right to gather information about Cuba by means of personal
observation, but the Court characterized the State Department's policy as "an inhibition
of action" and noted that "[t]here are few restrictions on action which could not be
clothed by ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow." Id. at 16-17. "The
right to speak and publish," said the Court, "does not carry with it the unrestrained
right to gather information." Id. at 17. The inclusion of the adjective "unrestrained"
would seem to indicate an unwillingness to deny the existence of some form of right to
gather information, especially by means not so easily classified as "action."
In Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), the Court denied the claims of several
news reporters to be immune from the obligation to testify regarding information
learned from confidential sources. The majority opinion recognized in dictum, however, that the information gathering interests raised by the news reporters' claims were
of constitutional stature: "Nor is it suggested that news gathering does not qualify for
First Amendment protection; without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated." Id. at 681.
In Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974), and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417
U.S. 843 (1974), the Court rejected claims of a first amendment right of journalists to
conduct face-to-face interviews with prison inmates, holding that "newsmen have no
constitutional right of access to prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the general public." Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 850; Procunier,417 U.S. at 834. However, the Justices did
not state or suggest that the general public has no right to know, and indeed implied
quite the contrary. Moreover, the Court cited the Branzburg dictum regarding the existence of first amendment protection for news gathering, Procunier, 417 U.S. at 833, and
emphasized how much the prison regulations at issue afforded meaningful opportunities
for the press and public to investigate prison conditions. See Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 848;
Procunier,417 U.S. at 830.
146. For examples of right to know rhetoric, see ProvidenceJournal Co. v. FBI, 460
F. Supp. 762, 776 (D.R.I. 1978) ("In the originial floor debate [on the Freedom of Information Act], Representative Moss affirmed that: 'Inherent in the right of free speech
and of free press is the right to know. It is our solemn responsibility as inheritors of the
cause to do all in our power to strengthen those rights.' ") (quoting 112 Cong. Rec.
13,002 (1966)); Aaron Burr's Trial, Robertson's Rep. II, 517 (1808) ("In a government
of responsibility like ours, where all the agents of the public must be responsible for
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view has not heretofore been necessary to maintain the requisite
minimal level of openness is not determinative on the issue of the existence vel non of some form of right to know, however circumscribed, as a
core commitment of the first amendment.
A complication in the analysis is introduced, however, by the fact
that any central norm of the first amendment relating to the right to
know would derive largely from long-held operating assumptions
rather than from historically significant resolutions of hard-fought disputes. Because of that derivation, it is difficult to specify what particular rights to inquire into the workings of the government should qualify
for inclusion in the core of the first amendment. In fact, the argument
for treating the right to know as a core commitment depends on considerations of aggregate impact: if government is able to shield its operations from public scrutiny on too many fronts, essential expectations
of accountability will cease to guide the behavior of both officials and
private citizens. As important as those expectations may be to the success of the governmental enterprise, few if any rights of inquiry viewed
in isolation can be regarded as essential to the maintenance of the requisite expectations.
I conclude that the absence of greater specification from the historical processes that determine the core of the first amendment should
not be a controlling factor in the analysis. The adjudication of novel
claims of access to information should proceed on the assumption that
at least some traditional prerogatives of inquiry concerning the conduct
of government are of such aggregate importance in the constitutional
scheme as to represent core commitments. It would be anomalous for
a constitutional regime founded on the principle of limited government
not to impose some fundamental restrictions on the power of officials
to keep citizens ignorant of how the authority of the state is being exercised. That conclusion, it should be emphasized, does not gain support
from the pathological perspective. The role of the pathological perspective is only to suggest some priorities and strategic considerations
that help to protect a set of core commitments determined independently of the choice of perspective.
Whatever the exact contours of the various rights to gather information that qualify as core commitments of the first amendment, there
is reason to believe that in pathological periods those rights will be
threatened. The degree to which outsiders have access to information
about government is a function of numerous discretionary official practices that could be altered unilaterally in times of stress. Whenever a
their conduct, there can be but few secrets. The people of the United States have a right
to know every public act .

. . .")

(statement of Burr's attorney, Benjamin Botts); T.

Wortman, Treatis Concerning Political Inquiry and Liberty of the Press 29 (1800)
("mhe government which attempts to coerce the progress of opinion, or abolish the
freedom of investigation into political affairs, materially violates the most essential principles of the Social State.").
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major shift occurs in the attitudes of officials regarding the desirability
of informed scrutiny of their work, those officials typically have at their
disposal the practical capacity to impair such scrutiny considerably. No
statutes need be passed; no injunctions need be obtained. The control
the military has exerted recently over press coverage of its operations
may be an extreme example but a revealing one all the same. 14 7 Fifteen
years ago, when some law enforcement officials were disturbed by news
coverage of their treatment of certain dissidents, large numbers ofjournalists were subpoenaed and searched, to the apparent detriment of
their ability to gather information from fearful news sources. 148 The
right to know is vulnerable to informal, widespread encroachment. In
particularly stressful periods, that encroachment could be severe.
In addition, the constitutional system's capacity to abide by its
other core commitments may be partly a function of its capacity to
maintain a meaningful right to know. Those within government who
are tempted in the grip of pathology to make incursions on the core
commitments of the first amendment may be checked most effectively
by well informed critical scrutiny of their plans. The elusive, fragile
ethic of accountability that can be nurtured by the right to know may in
the last analysis be the lifeblood of any successful system of constitutional limitations.
The upshot of these speculations, somewhat to my surprise, is that
the Supreme Court's current approach to the right to know makes a
good deal of sense from the standpoint of the pathological perspective.
The most significant concern ought to be that in a future pathology the
fears of the populace will make politically feasible a closing up of the
processes of government to such an extent that officials will be unaccountable for their actions in some important spheres. That development can be warded off by a strict insistence, as a matter of
constitutional doctrine, that traditional standards of openness in government be maintained. Accordingly, the fact that a certain government activity has historically been open to public inspection should
weigh heavily in the judgment whether in a particular context claims of
confidentiality outweigh claims of critical scrutiny. So long as tradition
is given its due, so much of the right to know as can properly be considered a core commitment of the first amendment should remain intact. 149 A more expansive right to know derived from functional as well
147. See Castro, Keeping the Press from the Action, Time, Nov. 7, 1983, at 65-66;

Friedrich, "Anybody Want to Go To Grenada?," Time, Nov. 14, 1983, at 70-73.
148. See Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 Mich. L. Rev. 229

(1971).
149. Thus, the traditional reluctance of litigants to subpoena news reporters, see
id., would weigh heavily in the judgment whether the first amendment grants journalists
a testimonial privilege not to reveal their confidential sources. But see Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). The prerogatives journalists traditionally have enjoyed to

observe military operations would also be relevant to first amendment claims they assert
in that context.
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as historical considerations might have certain advantages, but if the
introduction of functional reasoning were to weaken the regime's capacity to protect the core aspects of the right to know, the pathological
perspective should lead us to view the trade-off as undesirable. 15 0
Of course, some of the advantages of an expansive right to know
are not unrelated to the goal of protecting the core of the first amendment. The more outsiders can scrutinize official conduct, the more difficult it is for any part of the government to violate the most basic
commitments of the Constitution. If the practical capacity of outsiders
to detect and forestall incursions on the core commitments of the first
amendment hinged on the difference between a functional and an historical conception of the right to know, the argument for preferring the
potentially more expansive functional approach would be powerful. It
is not evident, however, how important to the successful investigation
of government misconduct is the relative breadth of the constitutional
right to know. Surely the ingenuity and dedication of the investigators
matters far more than the level of support provided by the slow-moving
adjudicative apparatus of the constitutional regime. Moreover, it is
only a certain type of official behavior that concerns us here: plans,
practices, or shifts in attitude that threaten the core commitments of
the first amendment. Wlhatever the value of an expansive right to know
for exposing the full range of government activity to public view in ordinary times, it is doubtful that the breadth of the right to know is an
important variable in the specialized constitutional struggles that occur
in pathological periods.
Most pathological challenges to the core commitments of the first
amendment are quite overt. Those challenges often flow from and feed
upon popular hysteria. It is true that details regarding the repressive
measures that are being employed may not be known to the public, and
may be more easily discovered with the help of an expansive right to
know. But the incremental effect in this regard of an expansive rather
than tradition-based right to know remains highly speculative. Given
the anxieties and regulatory impulses that operate during pathological
periods, exposure of the details of repressive programs often will not
have the constraining effect on government that such exposure could
have in normal times. No doubt a right to know determined by functional as well as historical considerations would contribute somewhat to
the protection of the core commitments of the Constitution, but not
150. Even a strong commitment to a tradition-based view of the right to know
would not eliminate certain fundamental problems of interpretation. In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982), the petitioner claimed that the general
tradition of open criminal trials supported its claim of a right to observe the testimony of
ajuvenile sex offense victim. The respondent argued that the more specific tradition of
intermittently excluding the public from sex offense trials supported its contention that
the press had no first amendment right to observe the testimony in question. The Court
ruled that the tradition of open criminal trials in general was the more appropriate
benchmark, and granted the petitioner's constitutional claim.
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enough in my judgment to justify the methodological costs outlined
above that would accompany such an expansive approach.' 5 '
This is not to say that adoption of the pathological perspective
commits one to a restrictive, tradition-dominated view of the right to
know. As one who accords special priority to the value of free speech
as a check on abuses of official power of all sorts, not just those that
threaten the core commitments of the Constitution, I would interpret
the first amendment to require a more expansive, more functionally determined right to know than that so far recognized by the Supreme
Court.' 5 2 That I hold such a view despite the foregoing analysis only
serves to illustrate how the pathological perspective is just one of several considerations that should figure in the formulation of first amendment doctrine.
3. Freedom of Association. - Nowhere does the constitutional text
mention the freedom of association, but the Supreme Court has decided that the freedoms of speech, press, and assembly imply a right to
join together with others to exchange ideas or promote causes. 153 The
first amendment freedom of association restricts the power of government to make individuals vicariously responsible for the unlawful actions and intentions of their political confederates,15 4 protects
individuals from being coerced into joining political associations with
which they prefer not to be affiliated,' 55 and limits the extent to which
public employment and government benefits can be withheld from persons on account of the political company they keep.' 5 6 In addition, the
freedom of association prohibits government from seeking to prescribe
the membership, internal structure, and basic character of certain types
from official
of organizations,' 5 7 and in some circumstances5 immunizes
8
inquiry information relating to these matters.'
The freedom of association takes on a special significance during
pathological periods. Such periods are characterized by a search for
scapegoats, and unpopular organizations serve that social need well. In
order to justify a suspension of traditional levels of tolerance, would-be
regulators typically must identify a threat to the values of the community that can be described as unusual in its magnitude or intensity.' 59
Uncoordinated developments regarding the beliefs and behavior pat151. See supra p. 490.
152. See Blasi, Checking Value, supra note 7, at 591-611.
153. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958).

154. Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S.
203, 219-24, 228-30 (1961).
155. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 232-37 (1977); Elrod v. Bums,

427 U.S. 347 (1976) (plurality opinion).
156. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1 (1971);
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
157. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
158. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 461-66 (1958).
159. For a valuable anthology of writings in this vein, see D. Davis, supra note 2.
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terns of the populace can of course threaten social stability, but not in
so vivid and frightening a way as a "conspiracy" or a movement orchestrated by well-organized groups. It may almost be considered a defining feature of a pathological period that public or official attention is
focused to an unusual extent on the machinations of dissident political
groups.
Not only is the freedom of association especially prone to be challenged in times of stress, the distinctive dynamics of pathological periods make such challenges likely to be effective. Private sanctionsshunning, ridicule, employment discrimination in the private sectortend to play a special role in pathological times due to the high level of
shared anxiety and the consequent forging of a communal mentality
that exalts orthodoxy. When the pack is running, the mere disclosure
of a person's vague, attenuated association with a scapegoated group
can generate private sanctions that only the hardiest souls would not
temper their convictions to avoid. Precisely because associational involvements tend to be flexible and intermittent, they are among the
most readily abandoned of first amendment activities. Yet the collective effect of countless individual decisions to opt for discretion over
valor can be devastating to the quality of the nation's political life.
Thus, from the standpoint of the pathological perspective a strong,
resilient interpretation of the freedom of association is indicated.
Without the benefit of explicit consideration of the pathological perspective, the Supreme Court has already developed some innovative,
quite protective doctrines in this area. 160 Nevertheless, acceptance of
my thesis would counsel that the freedom of association be strengthened even further.
First, a stronger principle against guilt by association is needed.
The Court has held that an individual can be punished for membership
in an organization that advocates the violent overthrow of the government if the organization advocates such an overthrow as speedily as
circumstances permit and the individual knows of that advocacy, is an
active member of the organization, and has a specific intent to forward
its illegal aims. 16i Insofar as it permits persons to be held criminally
liable for public advocacy engaged in by their political confederates,
that doctrine should be overruled. Even when a member actively participates in the affairs of an organization and knows about and shares its
illegal objectives, vicarious criminal responsibility for the speeches and
writings of others is not warranted. 162 In pathological periods,
160. See, e.g., Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (plurality opinion); Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation
Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961).
161. See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 228-30 (1961).
162. Criminal responsiblity should not be considered "vicarious" when it is based
on specifically defined conduct by the defendant, including verbal solicitation to illegal
advocacy, that is prohibited because of its significant causal connection to harmful con-
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factfinding processes cannot be relied upon to make discriminating
judgments regarding the intentions of persons who carry the stigma of
any kind of affiliation with a highly unpopular organization. Moreover,
given the inherent imprecision of any standard keyed to the quality of
one's membership or state of mind, in times of stress the only standard
of criminal liability that would not massively deter legitimate political
association is one based on personal rather than vicarious responsibility. Government has power enough to prevent its violent overthrow if
it can punish those who themselves do the advocating and the
planning.
Second, adoption of the pathological perspective should lead one
to favor greater protection against the compelled disclosure of a person's political affiliations than the Court has so far recognized. For example, as part of a general investigation into character and fitness, a
state may demand that an applicant for admission to the bar disclose
whether she has ever been a member of an organization that she knew
to be advocating the violent overthrow of the government. 163 Several
persons with exemplary credentials and recommendations have been
denied admission to the bar for refusal to reveal their political associations of bygone years, and the Supreme Court has upheld those denials. 16 Any kind of regularized, formal inquiry into political affiliation,
particularly for positions to which large numbers of persons aspire, is
bound to have an adverse impact on the willingness of all but the most
zealous and fearless to attach themselves to unpopular, or even potentially unpopular, causes and organizations. The marginal contribution
that information relating to political affiliation is likely to make to the
state's capacity to predict future behavior as a lawyer or public employee cannot justify what the pathological perspective suggests must
be counted a very heavy cost.
Occasionally, governments seek to discover the names of members
and financial supporters of political organizations not to screen applicants for positions of public responsibility but to determine whether
and how to regulate those organizations. 16 5 Laws designed to reduce
corruption in the financing of political campaigns, for example, typisequences. The type of liability that is problematic under the pathological perspective is
that which permits persons to be convicted for nothing more than failing to prevent,
repudiate, report, or disassociate themselves from the illegal advocacy of their political
associates. For an invaluable overview of the interaction between principles of criminal
liability and principles of free expression, see Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 Am.
B. Found. Research J. 645.
163. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154
(1971).
164. See In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36
(1961).
165. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63, 71-77 (1928).

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:449

cally require the disclosure of the names of financial contributors.1 66
The Supreme Court has held that organizations that demonstrate special reason to fear harassment of their members have a first amendment
right to keep their membership and contribution lists private absent a
compelling need for government to learn the information.1 67 In caseby-case adjudication, the Court has been sympathetic to claims of controversial groups that harassment would follow disclosure, and unsympathetic to claims by government investigators of a compelling need to
have access to membership and contribution lists.168 From the stand-

point of the pathological perspective, the confidentiality of membership
and contribution lists should not depend on so fragile a shield as sympathetic case-by-case adjudication under standards that call for highly
speculative, particularized judgments. In the worst of times, judges
cannot be expected to view the NAACP as the Court did in 1958, or the
Socialist Workers Party as the Court did in 1982. An absolute principle
forbidding the compelled disclosure of information revealing lawful
political affiliations and contributions is warranted given how readily
that information tends to be misused in pathological periods.
For the freedom of association issues discussed thus far, the pathological perspective counsels the adoption of extremely protective, absolute standards in areas already characterized by a high level ofjudicial
involvement and fairly protective first amendment doctrines. For a different set of freedom of association problems, the contribution of the
pathological perspecive lies mainly in suggesting that the role of constitutional principles and judicial standards should be much more
prominent than has been the case heretofore. I refer to the issues that
arise when law enforcement and military authorities engage in the systematic surveillance of groups that are organized, at least in part,
around a set of political commitments.
In Laird v. Tatum, 16 9 the Supreme Court ruled that no justiciable
controversy was created by the mere existence of a system of political
surveillance conducted by the United States Army. The plaintiffs alleged that their exercise of associational rights was chilled by the
Army's practice of sending undercover agents to public rallies and compiling files on political activists from local police records and newspaper clippings. The Court held, however, that there was no cognizable
injury absent an allegation that the government was collecting or using
the information in a manner that was "regulatory, proscriptive, or com166. See Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87 (1982);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 60-84 (1976) (per curiam).
167. Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87 (1982);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463-66 (1958).
168. Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87 (1982);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463-66 (1958).
169. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
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pulsory" in its impact on the plaintiffs.' 70 Subsequent to that decision,
lower courts have rejected first amendment challenges to such practices
as the use of informers and infiltrators to report on private meetings of
political organizations,' 7 1 the monitoring of the bank and telephone
records of such groups,' 7 2 and the dissemination within the law en73
forcement community of information about lawful political activities.1
When plaintiffs have alleged, however, that surveillance practices were
undertaken not to solve or prevent crimes but to disrupt or defame
political organizations, or to provoke members into committing crimes
that would discredit their organizations, a number of lower court
judges have distinguished Laird v. Tatum and treated the constitutional
74
claims as cognizable.'
The unwillingness of courts to recognize first amendment limits on
political surveillance absent "bad faith" on the part of the investigating
authorities can be explained by a number of considerations. So long as
the surveillance is reasonably discreet, one might question whether
enough persons will be convinced of its existence to generate a meaningful chilling effect. Even were the chilling effect demonstrable, courts
understandably would be reluctant to prevent the state from collecting
data it deems relevant to crime prevention by methods that are considered legitimate when used against nonpolitical groups. Thejudicial inclination to defer to professional expertise must be strong when law
enforcement authorities claim that data concerning seemingly innocuous political rhetoric and affiliation may someday be significant in reconstructing the trail of a crime that is anything but innocuous.
Because a wide variety of political ideologies justify the selective use of
force if only as a last resort, no clean distinction can be made between
groups that are essentially "political" in nature and those that are "violent" or "criminal." And even if appropriate standards could be devel170. Id. at 11.

171. See Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen., 510 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1974);
Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 349 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); see also Alliance to
End Repression v. City of Chicago, 742 F.2d 1007 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (consent

decree interpreted narrowly to bar FBI from conducting investigations "solely on the
basis of activities protected by the First Amendment," but not to prohibit investigations

of political conduct having a "basis in a genuine concern for law enforcement"; dictum
stressing the social importance of surveillance).
172. See Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. AT&T, 593 F.2d 1030 (D.C.
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 949 (1979); Fifth Ave. Peace Parade Comm. v. Gray,
480 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1973).
173. See Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Religious Soc'y of Friends v. Tate, 519
F.2d 1335 (3d Cir. 1975).
174. See ACLU v. City of Chicago, 431 F. Supp. 25 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Alliance to End
Repression v. Rochford, 407 F. Supp. 115 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Handschu v. Special Servs.
Div., 349 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). See generally Chevigny, Politics and Law in the
Control of Local Surveillance, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 735 (1984) (overview of actions in
several jurisdictions challenging political surveillance and comparison of various regulatory approaches).
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oped in this area, the fact that most surveillance is surreptitious would
make it almost impossible for courts and successful parties to determine whether judicial orders were being obeyed. An unfounded but
necessarily irrefutable rumor that police are not complying with a court
order restricting surveillance could resurrect the very type of chilling
effect on association that judicial intervention was designed to prevent.
Finally, the difficulty of devising appropriate legal standards and remedies underscores how institutionally ill-equipped courts are to deal with
the problem of improper surveillance. In contrast, numerous congressional investigations and the carefully drafted and revised Attorney
General's Guidelines apparently have produced in recent years a
marked increase in self-restraint in surveillance practices at the federal
level, a change more substantial than could ever have been achieved by
175
judicial decrees.
From a conventional perspective, these considerations would suggest that the laudable goal of controlling political surveillance should
not be one of the Court's priorities of doctrinal involvement. Viewed
from the pathological perspective, however, the problem of political
surveillance assumes such importance that every effort should be expended to overcome the barriers to effective judicial intervention just
outlined. In the worst of times, the odds of a chilling effect actually
operating greatly increase. Methods of speech regulation that depend
on largely discretionary administrative decisions are especially problematic during pathological periods. The political sentiments that have
apparently produced some significant reforms in surveillance practices
in recent years cannot be expected to endure; when the body politic
suffers its next pathology, congressional investigators and Justice Department officials will demand more political surveillance, not less.
And the costs generated by political surveillance in stressful times cut
to the core of the first amendment: large numbers of persons are deterred from exercising one of the most fundamental of expressive liberties, the right to gather together with others to exchange ideas or
promote shared ideals. Methodological strains notwithstanding, the
control of political surveillance ought to be one of the Court's priorities
of doctrinal involvement.
175. See Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enter-

prise and Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations (March 7, 1983), reprinted in Department ofJustice Press Release, March 7, 1983; The Attorney General's Guidelines on
Domestic Security Investigations (Nov. 4, 1976), reprinted in FBI Statutory Charter:
Hearings on S.1612, Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.

18-26 (1978). See generally R. Morgan, Domestic Intelligence: Monitoring Dissent in
American (1980) (discussing post-Watergate efforts at reform while cautioning against
excessive limitations on domestic intelligence gathering); Elliff, The Attorney General's
Guidelines for FBI Investigations, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 785 (1984) (analyzes various sets
of Attorney General's guidelines on domestic security investigations in light of their first
amendment implications).

PATHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

1985]

4. Politicalregulation ofpublic school classroom discussion and library contents. - Democratically elected school boards and legislatures set educational standards and determine curricular priorities for the public
schools. Occasionally that authority is exercised to exclude certain
books or topics of discussion that some students, parents, or teachers
176
believe should be included in the particular educational program.
Few would dispute the general power of school boards and legislatures
to make priority judgments regarding how scarce educational resources
are to be expended. When the circumstances indicate, however, that
the decision to exclude material was based not on scarcity but on a desire to shield students from disapproved ideas or forms of expression,
some courts have recognized first amendment limitations on the auor to
thority of school boards to remove books from school libraries
17 7
dismiss teachers for discussing forbidden topics in class.
The Supreme Court has confronted the issue only twice. In Epperson v. Arkansas178 the Justices held unconstitutional under the first
amendment an Arkansas law that made it a crime for a public school
teacher to teach the theory that mankind evolved from a lower order of
animals. Justice Fortas, writing for the majority, alluded to the potential conflict between the freedom of speech and political regulation of
the school curriculum but preferred to resolve the case on a "narrower" ground: he found the Arkansas law sufficiently motivated by
"fundamentalist sectarian conviction" 79 to amount to an impermissible establishment of religion. Justice Stewart rejected the religious motivation rationale; he concurred on the ground that the state law might
well "make it a criminal offense for a public school teacher so much as
to mention the very existence of an entire system of respected human
thought," a result he thought "would clearly impinge upon the guarantees of free communication contained in the First Amendment
"180

Board of Education v. PicoI8 ' presented the issue whether a school
board has unlimited discretion to remove from a school library books
that offend the moral or political sensibilities of board members and
their constituents. After receiving a list of objectionable books at a
political conference, members of a school board instituted a review of
eleven books in the school library by such authors as Kurt Vonnegut,
Desmond Morris, Richard Wright, Eldridge Cleaver, and Bernard
176. See generally Note, Schoolbooks, School Boards, and the Constitution, 80

Colum. L. Rev. 1092 (1980) (suggesting standards for federal court review of educational reasonableness of school board exclusions of material).
177. See, e.g., Pico v. Board of Educ., 638 F.2d 404.(2d Cir. 1980), aftd, 457 U.S.
853 (1982); Kingsville Indep. School Dist. v. Cooper, 611 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1980);
Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976).
178. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).

179. Id. at 104-08.
180. Id. at 116 (Stewart, J., concurring in result).
181. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
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Malamud. In a press release, the board characterized the books as
" 'anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Sem[i]tic, and just plain
filthy.' "s182 A committee of parents and teachers was appointed to evaluate the educational suitability and good taste of the books, but its recommendation that five of the books be returned to their shelves was
rejected by the board. Several students sued, alleging that the board
had violated their first amendment rights by making social, political,
and moral taste rather than educational value the criterion for book
retention.
The Supreme Court held five-to-four that the trial judge erred in
dismissing the action at the summary judgment stage. Four justices
concluded that if the school board intended by its removal of the books
to deny students access to ideas with which board members disagreed,
and if that intent was the decisive factor in the board's decision, a violation of the students' first amendment rights would be established. Justice White joined the judgment on the ground that a fuller record on
the issue of the motivations of the school board had to be developed
before the courts could decide the difficult issue of what, if any, motiva83
tion would establish a violation of the first amendment.
Four dissenters argued in Pico that any right of students to be free
from politically motivated book removal decisions would necessarily be
formless. Given the acknowledged function of the public schools to inculcate community values, "an elected school board must express its
views on the subjects which are taught to its students."1 8 4 No distinction is viable, in this view, between judgments based on vulgarity or
educational unsuitability and judgments based on political disapproval
because "virtually all educational decisions necessarily involve 'polit5
ical' determinations."'

8

One might be tempted to think that disputes of the sort represented by cases like Epperson and Pico only arise during periods of local
pathology. That is not true. Given the quite special political passions
that surround the administration of the public schools, as well as the
remarkable regional and local diversity in traditions and attitudes concerning elementary and secondary education, one cannot say that the
exclusion of authors such as Charles Darwin and Bernard Malamud can
only ensue from a breakdown in normal patterns of ideological toleration.18 6 A serious movement in any local commumity to ban The Origin
of Species or The Fixer from bookstores and general circulation public
libraries would surely mark the moment as pathological, but the nation's traditions are not such that the same can be said about a move182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
Crossfire

Id. at 857.
Id. at 883-84 (White, J., concurring).
Id. at 889 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Id. at 890 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
For a general discussion of the problem, see R. O'Neill, Classrooms in the
(1981).
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ment to purge those works from the public schools. None of the rights
of students and teachers that may be abridged by such exclusions-a
right to have convenient access to the excluded ideas, perhaps, or a
right to be free of a government-imposed orthodoxy-is sufficiently
well established and validated by tradition to constitute a core commitment of the first amendment. Indeed, a common feature of curriculumcontent and book-removal disputes is that one's sense of indignation at
the school board's narrow-mindedness tends greatly to outrun one's
capacity to identify the source and shape of the constitutional right allegedly infringed.
Despite these observations, adoption of the pathological perspective should lead courts to be more willing than would otherwise be the
case to develop first amendment limitations on the authority of school
boards to control the content of school libraries and classroom teaching. For the motivations and assumptions that lead a school board or
legislature to banish controversial ideas from the public schools are
motivations and assumptions that courts cannot afford to legitimate lest
the core commitments of the first amendment be placed in jeopardy.
As noted above, the capacity of the political community to abide by
those commitments in periods of unusual anxiety is highly dependent
on the deep-seated attitudes of the populace regarding the morality
and efficacy of toleration.18 7 Because the governance of the public
schools tends in this country to be a focal point for civic involvement,
judicial legitimation of intolerance of ideas in that setting cannot help
but legitimate intolerance in other settings. If a defiant or unsettling
idea is too dangerous to be tolerated in a high school during periods of
social stability, why is that idea not also too dangerous to be permitted
to circulate among discontented persons in the society at large during
periods of social unrest? One can argue, of course, that schoolchildren
are special by virtue of their youth, or that the school setting is special
by virtue of the inculcative mission of elementary and secondary education. 18 As an anlytical matter, censorship in the school setting can be
considered a distinct and isolated phenomenon, the legitimation of
which ought not to have consequences outside that unique setting. It is
most unlikely, however, that a populace that witnessed ideas being banished from the educational process on account of their dangerousness,
invalidity, or bad taste would internalize a strong taboo against the repression of ideas that challenge and threaten other institutions or endeavors. And it is just such a taboo that must operate among
substantial segments of the political community if the core commitments of the first amendment are to be respected during the worst of
times.
To say that courts ideally should not legitimate school board ac187. See supra pp. 456-57, 467.
188. See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 889-92, 894-97, 910-15 (1982)
(dissenting opinions of Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist).
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tions that reflect a fear of ideas is not to say that this problem area
ought to be a priority of doctrinal involvement for courts. Certain
forms ofjudicial involvement could be worse than no involvement at all
in terms of legitimating such school board actions. It is no small challenge to identify the source and contours of any constitutional right
that would constrain school board decisions regarding curriculum and
library contents. If the right were developed in such a way that litigation over school board decisions was common but school boards often
prevailed even when widely perceived to be acting out of censorial motives, the net result could be to weaken the taboo against intolerance of
threatening ideas. From the standpoint of the pathological perspective,
a high level ofjudicial involvement in curriculum and library disputes
would be salutary only if courts were to make meaningful assessments
of school board motivation, and not simply presume proper motivation
absent egregious evidence to the contrary. Yet a doctrine that depended so much on judicial inferences concerning school board motivation might be difficult to justify given the amorphous nature of the
injuries suffered by the complainants in disputes like Pico, the formidable evidentiary problems that plague any kind of inquiry into motivation,' 8 9 and the lack of any tradition in free speech jurisprudence of
treating illicit motivation as the gravamen of a constitutional
violation. 190
Whether these obstacles preclude the development of a robust
doctrine of motive review regarding curriculum and school library decisions depends on a number of considerations both theoretical and
practical. The contribution of the pathological perspective to the analysis would appear to be twofold. First, the importance during the worst
of times of general public attitudes regarding toleration strengthens
the argument for constitutional principles that focus on official motivations as well as identifiable individual injuries. From the pathological
perspective, judicial review in normal times exists as much to foster cer189. See Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. Ct. Rev. 95, 119-24.
190. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382-83 (1968) (first amendment challenge to draft card statute rejected on grounds that congressional purpose
"not a basis for declaring this legislation unconstitutional"); Barenblatt v. United States,
360 U.S. 109, 132-33 (1959) (judiciary without power to intervene in congressional investigation based on legislature's motive). The major instance of motive review in free
speech jurisprudence is Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936)
(state tax on newspaper receipts unconstitutional because real purpose was "to limit the
circulation of information"). In other areas of constitutional law such as equal protection and freedom of religion, motive review is an integral feature of the doctrinal tradition. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (state requirement that ten
commandments be posted in public schools unconstitutional since without "secular legislative purpose"); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (claim of racial discrimination "must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose"); Epperson
v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107-08 (1968) (state law forbidding teaching of evolution unconstitutional because based on "fundamentalist sectarian conviction").
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tain attitudes about the importance of free speech as to redress particular grievances. To the extent the judiciary has any influence on the
attitudes of the public regarding toleration, the way courts respond to
the phenomenon of censorial motivation on the part of government
would seem to be at least as important as the way courts respond to
traditionally cognizable injuries suffered by persons whose speech is
regulated.
Second, several of the practical considerations that have made
courts reluctant to base constitutional doctrine on the motivations of
regulators have less force if the frame of reference is pathological
times. It is often said, for example, that judicial review of motivation
cannot be effective because officials can always disguise their motives
and in any event can reenact an invalidated regulation taking care the
second time to profess proper motives. 19 1 But if the concern is that the
legitimation of censorship in the specialized setting of the schools will
lay the groundwork for more pervasive efforts to censor ideas during
periods of pathology, it matters how overt are the efforts to banish
threatening ideas. It would be no small contribution to the preservation of the central norms of the first amendment if a robust doctrine of
motive review were to force would-be censors of ideas in the schools to
rein in their rhetoric and forego appeals to ideological intolerance.
Moreover, although efforts to banish threatening ideas from the
schools can occur in non-pathological contexts, sometimes it may indeed be a pathological shift in attitudes that engenders political regulation of the school library and curriculum. On such occasions, those
who would suppress heresy tend to be rather explicit if not demogogic
about their motivations. A robust doctrine of motive review is not
likely to be thwarted by the circumspection of the censors. And even if
a court decision invalidating a regulation on grounds of motive can in
theory be overcome by a reenactment of the regulation with professions of noble motivation, the delay created by the initial invalidation
may be important in light of the volatility and rapid pace of events that
characterize many pathological periods.
I have not established in this brief discussion that a robust doctrine
of motive review would be workable in the context of disputes over
classroom topics and library contents. And it bears repeating that were
a full analysis to reveal that only a deferential doctrine of motive review
would be workable, the pathological perspective would counsel a judicial doctrine that severely discouraged constitutional challenges to
school board decisions, lest unsuccessful challenges have the effect of
legitimating censorial attitudes. There is, however, some reason to believe that a robust doctrine of motive review would be workable in this
area, 19 2 and one implication of the pathological perspective is to make
191. See Brest, supra note 189, at 119-27.
192. For two efforts to develop meaningful standards of motive review for disputes
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the development of such a doctrine a matter of high priority.
V.

PRACTICAL OBJECTIONS

A perspective is not a legal theory. Nor is it an analytical system. It
is a way of looking at issues that is designed to improve adjudication by
bringing into focus certain considerations that otherwise might be
overlooked or underemphasized. As such, my thesis cannot be defended entirely on the basis of its coherence, its logical derivation from
accepted normative premises, or its suggestiveness at the level of methodological and doctrinal implications. Ultimately, the argument for the
pathological perspective depends on the claim that the society's adherence to the central norms of the first amendment would increase were
courts to target doctrine for the worst of the times. For that reason, my
thesis rests on certain empirical premises regarding the capacities of
courts and the effects ofjudicial decisions, and is vulnerable to practical
objections that challenge those premises.
One objection concerns the unorthodox nature of the decision to
think systematically about the elusive dimension, "perspective." The
perspective that informs legal reasoning is not ordinarily the subject of
conscious, reasoned choice. Advocates, of course, frequently sketch
worst-case scenarios as a scare tactic, but the common tendency among
disinterested observers is to view such efforts as a species of rhetoric,
not an element of rigorous analysis. The notion of perspective is distressingly imprecise. Even if the legal culture were to agree that a particular perspective is appropriate for a certain class of cases, one must
wonder whether individual thought patterns that were even roughly
similar would result from such a consensus.
In my judgment, doubts about the efficacy of thinking explicitly
about perspective are more a function of the novelty of the endeavor
than of the inherent imprecision of the concept of perspective.
Whether consciously or not, judges, litigants, and critics who reason
about constitutional questions do so by adopting some perspective. It is
not as though perspective is an entirely new dimension in the analytical
calculus. In fact, the notion of perspective, as I use the term, relates to
one of the more familiar and concrete (albeit speculative) aspects of
legal reasoning: the assessment of future consequences. It would not
be an unintelligible injunction for an authoritative court to instruct its
inferiors to imagine future social dynamics of a certain distressing character and to estimate how the legal principles under consideration
would operate in the face of those dynamics. Such an injunction commands a shift of emphasis, and it may be that a duty to give emphasis is
no more enforceable than a duty to bargain in good faith. But the meaover book regulation in the schools, see Note, supra note 176; Note, Judicial Clairvoyance and the First Amendment: The Role of Motivation in Judicial Review of Book
Banning in the Public Schools, 1983 U. Ill. L. Rev. 731.
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sure of doctrinal efficacy should not be exclusively a function of susceptibility to coercive enforcement. In the complex, hierarchical social
system that is the American judiciary, signals often play a role that cannot be explained entirely by the sanctions that stand behind them. The
signal to give careful consideration to certain worst-case scenarios, and
not dismiss them as rhetorical ploys, is likely to command attention
among the various actors in the legal culture.
Moreover, my thesis could have an important practical impact even
if lower courts would not be induced to alter their thought patterns by a
higher court's general command to employ the pathological perspective. As I have shown, a focus on the worst of times should lead the
higher court to embrace certain methodologies and doctrines that
would in turn bind lower courts in the conventional fashion. Ideally,
advocates throughout the judicial system should be able to appeal directly to the pathological perspective in fashioning their arguments. If,
however, lower courts were only receptive to appeals to intermediate
concepts such as the chilling effect, journalistic autonomy, or a presumption against balancing standards, the indirect practical impact of
the pathological perspective would nonetheless be considerable.
That argument, however, speaks only to the possible impact of the
choice of perspective on the decisions of courts. For the pathological
perspective to make a practical contribution to the maintenance of a
constitutional tradition, the judicial decisions that result from that
choice of perspective must be enforceable. To be truly effective, those
decisions should also have a deterrent and hortatory influence on the
destructive social patterns of pathological periods. There is reason to
doubt whether courts have the influence that my thesis presupposes.
Learned Hand put it this way:
I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much
upon constitutions, upon laws and upon courts. These are
false hopes; believe me, these are false hopes. Liberty lies in
the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it; no constitution, no law, no
court can even do much to help it. While it 19
lies there it needs
no constitution, no law, no court to save it. 3
If Hand is not saying that courts have no role to play in the preservation of liberty, he is saying that courts can make a difference only in
relatively tranquil times. In the worst of times, social forces simply engulf the courts. It would be foolish to target doctrine for pathological
periods if, when those periods arrive, judicial decisions do not have
much impact. If that is true, it would make more sense to formulate
legal principles with an eye to those stable periods when law can help to
shape the society, if only in marginal ways.
Need we be so despairing about the role of law in pathological pe193. L. Hand, The Spirit of Liberty: Papers and Addresses of Learned Hand 89-90
(Dilliard ed. 1960).
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riods? It is true that in the two most significant periods of national
pathology in this century, the Red Scare and the McCarthy Era, the
courts did very little to stem the tide of intolerance. 194 Those experiences, however, say far more about judicial unwillingness to confront
pathology than about judicial incapacity to do so. Had the core commitments of the first amendment been better developed in 1919 and
1951, and had the judges of those eras had recourse to a doctrinal tradition informed by the pathological perspective, the courts might well
have played a constructive role.
Perhaps not. Perhaps the most carefully prepared doctrines would
be abandoned by the judiciary in the face of the pressures that were
rampant in 1919 and 1951. Or if the pathological perspective had its
intended effect on judges, perhaps the society would simply ignore
what courts had to say. These are genuine possibilities. But I require
more than the easily distinguished lessons of the Red Scare and McCarthy periods, and more than the pessimism of Learned Hand, before I
am willing to regard judicial ineffectiveness in pathological periods as
an historical imperative.' 9 5 The issue, it is worth remembering, is not
whether "[I]iberty lies in the hearts of men and women .

.

. " but

whether what courts do, both before and during a pathology, can have
an impact on whether liberty continues to lie there. Under the pathological perspective, one of the most important objectives of adjudication is the inculcation throughout the political culture of a deep and
abiding respect for the core commitments of the first amendment.
Moreover, national pathologies are not the only instances of the
worst of times. The nation's checkered history regarding civil liberties
provides affirmative evidence that local pathologies can indeed be con194. The judicial performance preceding and during the Red Scare is brilliantly
documented in Z. Chafee, supra note 14, at 36-282. The outstanding example of a
courageous judge resisting pathological pressures is the opinion of District Judge
George W. Anderson in Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 F. 17 (D. Mass 1920). For a sampling
ofjudicial decisions upholding repressive regulatory measures during the McCarthy Era,
see supra note 74.
195. One might be tempted to cite the domestic controversy over the Vietnam War
as an example ofjudicial capacity to protect the rights of unpopular speakers in the face
of urgent calls for conformity. The Supreme Court upheld the first amendment claims of
war protestors on numerous occasions. See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405
(1974); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971);
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966); see also New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (unsuccessful government attempt
to enjoin publication of classified documents relating to Vietnam policy). But see
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). However, it is questionable whether concern about dissent over the Vietnam War reached pathological proportions in many
parts of the country, and it is not likely that a national pathology of repression would
have ensued had those cases gone the other way. The courts no doubt played some role
during that period in preserving the basic liberties of expression, but the political power
of the constituency that claimed the right to criticize the war was almost surely the predominant factor.
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strained by courts. In fact, the roll call of landmark Supreme Court
decisions interpreting the first amendment includes a remarkable
number of cases that arose in the context of local pathologies. Meyer v.
Nebraska,19 6 Near v. Minnesota,' 97 Grosjean v. American Press,19 8 Herndon v.
Lowry,' 9 9 Hague v. CIO,200 NAACP v. Alabama,20 ' Sweezy v. New Hampshire,20 2 Kingsley Pictures v. Regents, 20 3 Epperson v. Arkansas,20 4 and New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan 20 5 each defused or effectively repudiated a program of systematic repression of unpopular speakers by local officials.
Precisely because these were local pathologies, the national judiciary
was for the most part immune from the pressures and fears that so exercised local officials. And whether out of respect for the rule of law,
fear of the massive power of the federal government, or lack of continuing interest in the project of repression, the local officials whose actions
triggered those disputes did not defy the Supreme Court. Even if
courts had little practical capacity to effect the course of a national pathology, my thesis would be important because of its potential impact
on local pathologies.
If we focus for a moment longer on these success stories, however,
a different objection to adopting the pathological perspective can be
discerned. In the cases just mentioned, the Supreme Court not only
protected unpopular speakers in stressful situations, but did so by
means of dramatic innovations in doctrine. Those cases are not examples of the Court staying true to established principles in difficult times;
they are cases of the Court reaching out boldly to fashion new principles to meet newly perceived and presently felt threats to liberty.
There may be a lesson in this. As a practical matter, courts may do a
better job of combatting pathologies by adopting an approach to constitutional adjudication that is more ad hoc and reactive than that indicated by my thesis.
A strategy of flexible, ad hoc response has the advantage of requiring less speculation and generalization by courts. Such a strategy has
the disadvantage of depending on the capacity of judges operating
without the benefit of doctrinal prompting to perceive the advent of a
particular pathology and avoid being swept up in the fearful mentality
of the day. If the only concern were local pathologies and if all first
amendment disputes that grew out of such experiences reached the
196. 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (decided under the rubric of due process at a time when
the first amendment had not yet been incorporated against the states).
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Supreme Court, an ad hoc approach to combatting pathology might
well be preferable. It required no special perspective for the Supreme
Court to perceive and stand up to the threats to free speech posed by
the petty tyrants of Jersey City2 0 6 and Montgomery. 20 7 A certain
amount of doctrinal innovation was required before those threats could
be thwarted, but no special theory of pathology was needed to stimulate the necessary innovations.
The desirability of a more systematic approach to pathology stems
from the fact that most instances of pathological repression do not fit
this model of local excess subject to review in a geographically remote
and politically insulated Supreme Court. Most local pathologies must
be combatted by district and circuit judges who have closer ties to the
political communities that are gripped by pathological anxieties and a
weaker warrant to innovate in the formulation of first amendment doctrine. 20 8 Some pathologies, moreover, are of such scope and intensity
as to call into question the capacity of the Supreme Court to respond
wisely if its mode of operation is predominantly reactive and ad hoc.
Under those conditions, the long-range perspective demanded by my
thesis is more likely, as a practical matter, to generate in judges the
awareness and fortitude that is needed.
The benefits that derive from a systematic, long-term consideration of pathology must be discounted, however, to the extent that
courts are incapable of estimating what kinds of doctrinal fortifications
will be most effective in combatting the pathologies of the future. One
might question whether courts have that capacity. It would make no
sense to design doctrine in light of the pathological perspective simply
as a means of retrospectively repudiating past regulatory experiences;
prospective impact is what justifies courts in adopting the pathological
perspective. Any judicial effort to abort or temper the excesses of the
future may be doomed because we lack the foresight to know what the
next pathology will look like. The tendency of generals to prepare for
the previous war should give judges pause.
These concerns regarding the judicial capacity to generalize and
project are understandable, but they should not be viewed as controlling. It is true, of course, that no two pathologies look alike. Variations
on the theme of anxious repression abound, even regarding such fundamental matters as the types of scapegoats that capture the public imagination (alien workers, disloyal public employees, liberal journalists,
outside agitators) and the types of regulatory mechanisms that are most
heavily employed (deportations, legislative investigations, civil damage
206. See Z. Chafee, supra note 14, at 409-31 (discussing Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S.
496 (1939)).
207. See H. Kalven, The Negro and the First Amendment (1966).
208. On the pressures that district and circuitjudges must confront during periods
of local pathology, see J. Bass, Unlikely Heroes (1981); J. Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely
Men (1961).
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actions, conspiracy prosecutions). There are nonetheless some general
patterns that can be discerned in the nation's experience with pathology, and a decision to focus on those patterns can have some significant
methodological and doctrinal implications, as I have tried to demonstrate. Some future pathologies no doubt will be so utterly novel and
unpredictable as to confound the most careful doctrinal planners. But
that experience is likely to prove exceptional. Our analysis of methodological and doctrinal implications was governed by practical considerations that can be expected to come into play in a wide variety of
pathological situations. Whatever the exact shape of a future pathology, for example, discretionary regulatory authority is likely to be much
more problematic than it is in normal times. The chilling effect is likely
to merit serious examination in such a period. And so on. Precise scenarios were not the basis for our analysis of implications, nor were precise scenarios important in developing the theoretical argument for
adopting the pathological perspective. A certain amount of judicial
foresight and capacity to generalize is indeed a prerequisite for successful employment of the pathological perspective, but not so much as to
render my thesis untenable on practical grounds.
The last objection I shall consider derives from the observation
that alarmist thinking is often the cause of pathological repression. If
worst-case scenarios were to guide judges in measuring the dangers
various regulatory powers pose to free expression, might not worstcase scenarios also then be employed in assessing the potential social
costs of speech? If so, the pathological perspective could have the effect of reinforcing the alarmist thinking that engenders repressive excesses in difficult times. The implications for the familiar, cornerstone
issue of subversive advocacy are particularly disturbing. The worstcase scenario regarding the effects of revolutionary speech-with emphasis on such items as foreign domination, secret cells, training in terror tactics, and the like-could provide a justification for extensive
regulation. 20 9 As a practical matter, can the pathological perspective
function as a one-way street?
I do not believe judges should employ the pathological perspective
in assessing the dangers of unregulated expression. Nor do I think that
acceptance of my thesis would compel such a course in theory or generate such a course in practice. The harms that flow from communication
can be adequately appreciated and guarded against by means of conventional legal reasoning; there is no need for courts to structure their
analysis in a special way to ensure proper emphasis in evaluating those
harms.
The pathological perspective is justified because the first priority of
the constitutional system is to preserve the integrity and credibility of
its core commitments. When courts fail to enforce the core commit209. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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ments, rarely do other social or political forces serve to mitigate the
harm. Members of the political community whose rights are infringed
are left with no recourse. The damage to the constitutional system is
incalculable when its most basic commitments turn out to be inoperative in stressful times.
In contrast, even if there really are exceptional moments during
which the costs of free expression are dramatically greater than in normal times, strict speech-protective judicial doctrines are not likely to
cause severe harm on such occasions. When the day arrives that the
price of adherence to the core commitments of the first amendment is
more than the society truly can bear, we can be sure that some powerful
correctives will operate. Judges will search desperately and often successfully to find ways to distinguish or reformulate the protective constitutional principles. Public officials will simply ignore unrealistic
constitutional constraints. Martial law may be declared. A constitutional amendment could be passed. No political community will ever
let its constitution serve as a suicide pact. No legal principles formulated with pathological scenarios in mind are needed to reinforce society's instinct toward self-preservation.
It may seem incongruous to invoke the possibility of a suspension
or repudiation of basic liberties in the midst of an argument that the
pathological perspective should be employed precisely to fortify those
liberties. However, no legal principle is invulnerable to reconsideration and possible evisceration, no matter what perspective governs adjudication. It serves no purpose to pretend otherwise. The conscious
choice of a perspective is to some degree an exercise by the legal culture in self-paternalism. The point of targeting first amendment doctrine for the worst of times is to check the tendency ofjudges (and most
other actors) too ready to opt for the suspension of basic liberties, by
subtle undermining and niggardly construction if not by forthright
decree.
Viewed as an exercise in self-paternalism, the pathological perspective can only be a one-way street. If the problem is that in stressful
times courts tend to overestimate the dangers posed by unorthodox
ideas and threatening speakers, that tendency would be exacerbated,
not mitigated, were first amendment doctrine to be formulated with an
eye to those periods when dissenting speech is indeed most damaging.
Only with regard to the dangers of excessive regulation of speech is the
pathological perspective likely to serve its self-paternalistic function.
Good reasons therefore exist for not extending the preference for
worst-case analysis to the project of estimating the dangers posed by
threatening speech. However, those reasons are unlikely to be appreciated during the worst of times, and thus do not put to rest the concern
that adoption of the pathological perspective could boomerang. If as a
result of their familiarity with the pathological perspective judges or
other important decisionmakers were to develop a temperamental re-
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ceptivity to speculative, alarmist arguments of all sorts, the practical im-

pact of my thesis could be the opposite of what I intend.
I do not believe that the adoption of the pathological perspective
as a strategy for safeguarding the core commitments of the first amendment in stressful periods is likely to stimulate more general patterns of
alarmist thinking. The rationale for the pathological perspective is
quite specific, and the implications I have explored add up to a fairly
detailed set of methodological and doctrinal norms. The rhetoric demanded by my thesis would emphasize particular object lessons of the
past. Concern about the tendency of the society to overreact to threatening speech permeates that rationale, those norms, and that rhetoric.
It is difficult to imagine how a legal culture that adopted the reasoning
process I envision would be more likely on that account to engage in
precisely the type of overreaction the process is designed to prevent,
simply because one feature of that process is the employment of worstcase analysis. In practice, the specific discrediting of a particular type
of alarmism figures to have a greater impact than the legitimation of
something so abstract as an analytical method.
CONCLUSION

Ultimately, the argument for my thesis reduces to four basic propositions: (1) The protection and full realization of the core commitments of the first amendment is an objective that deserves especially
high priority in constitutional adjudication. (2) The core commitments
of the first amendment tend to be jeopardized most seriously during
certain periods that may be regarded as pathological due to their unusual social dynamics regarding the tolerance of dissent. (3) The adjudicative methodologies and doctrines that can best protect the core
commitments of the first amendment in pathological periods are those
that are consciously designed to counteract the unusual social dynamics
that characterize such periods. (4) The strategy of targeting first
amendment doctrine for the worst of times in the manner suggested by
my thesis does not generate unacceptable costs to the quality of adjudication in periods that are not pathological.
The first three propositions have been elaborated and defended in
the pages above. The last proposition, however, has not been addressed directly. The reason for that omission is that the proposition
embodies a priority judgment of the most basic sort that can only be
defended by reference to the strength of the thesis as a whole.
There can be no doubt that the methodologies and doctrines that
are implied by my thesis would not be ideally suited to the task of
resolving first amendment disputes in normal times. From any standpoint other than that of the pathological perspective, those methodologies and doctrines could be considered misdirected and coarse. Some
parties who would prevail in first amendment adjudication conducted
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from a more traditional perspective would lose their cases if courts
were to adopt the pathological perspective.
One must be careful, however, not to exaggerate the impact of
adoption of the pathological perspective on adjudication in normal
times. Because a perspective is neither a normative theory nor a rigorous analytical method, seldom would the obligation to consider pathological scenarios force judges to abandon strongly held views regarding
how a particular dispute should be resolved. The choice of perspective
is likely to have its greatest impact at the level of methodology, rhetoric, and abstract doctrinal formulation. My exploration of concrete
doctrinal implications did indeed suggest that numerous case outcomes
would be affected by the adoption of the pathological perspective, but
mostly in areas already marked by a high degree of judicial
ambivalence.
Nevertheless, it is not an unfair characterization to say that in normal times my thesis sometimes requires courts to do injustice today in
order to prepare to do justice tomorrow. But that is precisely the point.
The debate is over priorities. For the reasons I have specified, I believe
"justice tomorrow," that is in periods of pathology, must take priority
over "justice today." The central function of first amendment adjudication is not to resolve everyday disputes over communication but
rather to protect and implement the core commitments of the freedoms
of speech, press, and assembly in moments when those commitments
are most in jeopardy.

